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CARL J. BAUER*

Dams and Markets: Rivers and
Electric Power in Chile**
ABSTRACT
How are river systems governed under market-oriented water and
electricity policies? How are competing water and energy uses coordinated in a context of markets and privatization? I answer these
questions by studying hydropower in Chile as an example of the
water-energy nexus: that is, analyzing hydropower along the two
different axes of water law and electricity law. Chile is a world leader
in applying neoliberal policies in both water and electricity sectors,
and the national electricity system depends heavily on hydropower.
Because hydropower is both a use of water and a source of electricity,
it plays a different yet essential role in each sector. Hydropower
dams are governed by both water and electricity laws, but the two
laws treat water differently and value it for different purposes. I conclude that Chilean electricity law has granted de facto property
rights to water to the owners of hydropower dams, and that electricity law trumps water law in rivers with hydropower development.
This situation is bad news for water sustainability and governance.
In the context of climate change, the interactions between water and
energy are more complex and critical than in the past, and we need
more studies of hydropower’s dual roles in the two systems.

I. INTRODUCTION: HYDROPOWER AS WATER-ENERGY NEXUS
Electricity—carrier of light and power—devourer of time and
space—bearer of human speech over land and sea—greatest servant
of man—itself unknown.
—Carving on exterior of train station building,
Union Station, Washington, D.C., ca. 1908

Editors’ note: The Natural Resources Journal was not able to verify the foreign language
sources used in this article.
* Carl Bauer is Associate Professor, School of Geography and Development,
University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz., where he also directs the Graduate Certificate in
Water Policy. Bauer has a Ph.D. from the University of California–Berkeley Law School, an
M.S. in Geography from the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and a B.A. in Geology from
Yale University.
** I am grateful to Resources for the Future, the Weeden Foundation, and the
University of Arizona (including the Water Resources Research Center) for financial
support of this research. I thank Ronnie Fischer, Juan Pablo Orrego, Hugh Rudnick, and
Alejandro Vergara in Chile for their comments on earlier drafts, and Dustin Garrick,
Manuel Prieto, and David Tecklin for their comments and research assistance. Thanks to
Monica Stephens for the map.
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Hydropower is booming in Chile, driven by a perceived national
energy crisis and favored by international concerns about global warming and fossil fuels. Chile’s economic growth has been weakened by
chronic shortages of electric power over the past decade—triggered by a
severe drought in 1998 that caused blackouts in Santiago and worsened
by the decline of Argentina’s natural gas exports to Chile.1 The fact that a
drought helped to cause blackouts shows the country’s dependence on
hydropower. The Chilean government and business sector have responded to these problems by making new power development an urgent priority. Investors and power companies, both Chilean and foreign,
have proposed building dozens of new hydropower dams on rivers
throughout central and southern Chile.2 Other projects involve modifying existing dams and canals in order to increase their power generation.
The projects range in size from small to large, and many are under way
or already finished. Investors and power companies have also proposed
and built a variety of new thermal power plants.3
The proposed dams in Patagonia have gotten the headlines and
caused the most public conflict, both within Chile and internationally.4
Patagonia is the rugged and remote region shared by Chile and Argentina at the southernmost end of South America that is legendary for its
dramatic landscapes, harsh weather, and unique wildlife and
ecosystems.

1. See infra Part V.
2. Christián Viancos, Hidroeléctricas Retoman Fuerte Protagonismo en Inversiones, EL
MERCURIO (SANTIAGO), Aug. 29, 2005, at B1, available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/
index.asp?id=%7B51f15806-c770-48ca-9f2b-62845bb85c96%7D [hereinafter Viancos,
Hidroeléctricas Retoman Fuerte Protagonismo]; Christián Viancos, 23 Nuevos Proyectos Avivan
Oferta Eléctrica, EL MERCURIO (SANTIAGO), Aug. 29, 2005, at B9, available at http://
diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id=%7B51f15806-c770-48ca-9f2b-62845bb85c96%7D
[hereinafter Viancos, 23 Nuevos Proyectos]; Christián Viancos, La Millonaria Agenda Eléctrica,
EL MERCURIO (SANTIAGO), May 21, 2006, available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id=%7B44eb2b74-088d-4d83-a645-bcbdf23e1b82%7D [hereinafter Viancos, La Millonaria Agenda Eléctrica].
3. In Chile thermal power generation uses coal, natural gas, and oil, nearly all of
which are imported. See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Eléctrico en Chile (1996)
[hereinafter Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Eléctrico].
4. The following environmental magazine cover story gives a flavor of the international debate: “Patagonia Under Siege: Will Chile’s Booming, Energy-Hungry Economy
Lay Waste to the Country’s Last Untamed Frontier? A Global Parable.” See George Black,
Patagonia Under Siege: Will Chile’s Booming, Energy-Hungry Economy Lay Waste to the Country’s Last Untamed Frontier? A Global Parable, ONEARTH, Fall 2006, at 15, available at http://
www.nrdc.org/OnEarth/06fal/patagonia.pdf. More recently the New York Times published
an editorial, “Patagonia Without Dams,” with similar rhetoric. See Editorial, Patagonia Without Dams, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/
01/opinion/01tue3.html (the April Fool’s Day date appears to be a coincidence).
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The Andes Mountains, a range running north-south, separates Argentina and Chile. The Argentine side has much greater land area and
drier climatic conditions (due to the mountains’ rain shadow, because
the region’s weather systems generally move from west to east). In contrast, Chilean Patagonia is a narrow and rainy strip of land along the
Pacific coast (much like the Pacific Northwest coast of North America).
The rivers on the Chilean side are short and steep, running west from the
mountains to the sea and are still wild and undammed.5
An alliance of Spanish and Chilean power companies has planned
a series of large hydropower dams on rivers in Chilean Patagonia.6 The
Chilean government has generally supported the dams, as well as the
1200-mile transmission line that would be built to central Chile, with the
basic argument that the economic benefits outweigh the environmental
costs. For purposes of future hydropower development, Region XI
(Aysén) is by far the most important in Chile; this single region, with less
than 1 percent of the nation’s population, has more than 30 percent of its
total precipitation, runoff, and hydropower potential.7 Environmental organizations and eco-tourism interests in Chile, the United States, Canada, Europe, and elsewhere have been strongly opposed to building
dams in this region.8 Within Chile there is also growing interest in building a greener model of regional economic development in Patagonia—a
model based on eco-tourism and environmental amenities, rather than

5. See map infra Part IV.B. “Patagonia” is a term used loosely in Chile and Argentina.
In general it refers to the southernmost regions of both countries that are sparsely populated and with a harsh climate; however, there is no official definition. In Argentina, Patagonia is often considered to be everything south of the Colorado River, in the Province of
Neuquén (roughly 39 degrees south latitude). In Chile, Patagonia generally means the area
south of the city of Puerto Montt in Region X, which marks the southern end of “mainland”
Chile (roughly 42 degrees south latitude). Hence Chilean Patagonia consists of the country’s two administrative regions that are farthest south, Regions XI and XII (also called the
Regions of Aysén and Magallanes, respectively), as well as part of Region X. For historical
background, see HANS STEFFEN, PATAGONIA OCCIDENTAL (2009).
6. The Spanish company, ENDESA España, was recently bought by an Italian power
company, ENEL, in 2007 with no apparent effect on its operations in Chile. See “ENEL,
Acciona Acquire Endesa with $60 bn Bid,” THE FINANCIAL EXPRESS, Oct. 5, 2007, available at
http://www.financialexpress.com/printer/news/225195/.
7. Francisco Riestra, Hydrography of the Aysén Region, Address at the Pan-American Advanced Studies Institute (Jan. 2005); Luis Court, La Hidroelectricidad en Chile, 143
Revista de Ingenierı́a Chilena, 1994, at 26 [hereinafter Court, La Hidroelectricidad en Chile];
Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a en Chile (1989) [hereinafter Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I]. As discussed infra Part IV, Chilean engineers have
recognized this potential for many decades, but until recently the region’s great distance
from the country’s central electricity grid has made it too expensive to build any dams in
the region.
8. See sources cited supra note 4.
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the pattern of exploitation and export of natural resources that characterizes the rest of the country—and one campaign for a greener model of
economic development adopted the slogan: “Aysén—Life’s Reserve”
(Reserva de la Vida).9
A. Three Global Trends in Water and Energy Policies
The proposed dams in Patagonia make the current hydropower
boom unprecedented in Chilean history. Beyond the national context, the
Chilean case reflects global trends in water and energy policies that have
converged in recent years. The interactions between water and energy
policies are shaping the future sustainability of ecosystems and economic
systems around the world. Trends and conflicts in three areas will determine the future role of hydropower in water and energy systems: (1)
climate change; (2) privatization and markets; and (3) ecosystem services. Focusing on hydropower, as discussed below, offers a unique window into how all these issues interact.
The first global trend is the link between hydropower and climate
change. Hydropower development has been boosted around the world
by growing concerns of global warming and the need to reduce carbon
emissions.10 Because hydropower does not pollute the environment or
emit carbon, it is an essential part of discussions about moving to clean
and renewable energy systems. But hydropower’s problems are serious;
the negative environmental and social impacts of dams are now widely
recognized.11 Moreover, the changing climate shows the importance of
the many interactions and feedback loops between water and energy sys-

9. See, e.g., Ecosistemas, Home Page, http://www.ecosistemas.cl (last visited July 13,
2009); Patagonia Chilena ¡Sin Represas!, Home Page, http://www.patagoniasinrepresas.cl
(last visited July 13, 2009); Aisén Reserva de Vida, http://www.aisenreservadevida.com/
(last visited July 13, 2009); Coalición Ciudadana por Aisén Reserva de Vida, http://
aysenreservadevida.blogspot.com/ (last visited July 13, 2009). In 2008, a large coffee-table
book with beautiful photographs was published in Chile by many of these activists. See
PATAGONIA CHILENA ¡SIN REPRESAS! (Patricio Rodrigo & Juan Pablo Orrego eds., 2008).
10. See World Bank, Water Resources Sector Strategy: Strategic Directions for World
Bank Engagement (2004), at 17–18 [hereinafter World Bank, Strategic Directions]. For recent overviews of hydropower in South America and the global context, see Luiz Barroso et
al., Creating Harmony in South America, IEEE POWER & ENERGY MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 2006,
at 32; Hugh Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South America, IEEE POWER & ENERGY
MAGAZINE, July/Aug. 2008, 22 [hereinafter Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South
America].
11. PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS
(1996) [hereinafter MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS]; WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND
DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING (2000), available at http://www.
internationalrivers.org/en/africa/dams-and-development-new-framework-decision-makers [hereinafter WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT]; SANDRA POSTEL &
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tems. Water is needed to produce energy and energy is needed to make
water available. These interactions are sometimes called the “water-energy nexus” (or the “energy-water nexus”).12
The second trend has been the wave of policies favoring markets
and privatization since the 1980s that have transformed water and electricity systems in many countries. These policies are often called “neoliberal” and are referred to as the “Washington consensus,” although
different countries have adopted different versions of them.13 More recently there has been a backlash against free markets in most national
and international policy debates, which has begun to favor stronger government regulation in many areas, including electricity and finance.
Nevertheless, some basic principles of market economics, such as the
need to make trade-offs and increase efficiency in allocating resources,
will continue to influence water and energy policymaking in almost any
political context. The key question, in a nutshell, is how to find the right
balance between markets and regulation.14 In a world whose changing
climate means that water-energy interactions are more critical than
before, very few people have yet analyzed the water and energy sectors
together.
The third global trend is the growing policy emphasis on ecosystem goods and services as a way to think about sustainable development. There are various analytical approaches to these issues—with the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment probably the largest and best-known
study—but all share the common goal of combining ecology and economics in some holistic, interdisciplinary way.15 In the case of rivers and
freshwater ecosystems, protecting an environmental flow regime is the
BRIAN RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE: MANAGING WATER FOR PEOPLE AND NATURE (2003) [hereinafter POSTEL & RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE].
12. The water-energy nexus has begun to attract more policy analysis both internationally and within the United States. See, e.g., RONNIE COHEN ET AL., ENERGY DOWN THE DRAIN:
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CALIFORNIA WATER SUPPLY (2004); UNITED NATIONS INDUST. DEV.
ORG., Water and Energy, in 2ND UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEV. REPORT 305 (2006).
13. There is a vast literature about neoliberalism and the Washington Consensus. See,
e.g., PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI & JOHN WILLIAMSON EDS., AFTER THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS: RESTARTING GROWTH AND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (2003).
14. John Besant-Jones, Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have We
Learned?, Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper 19 (2006) [hereinafter BesantJones, Reforming Power Markets].
15. See The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, http://www.millenniumassessment.
org/en/Index.aspx (last visited July 13, 2009) (noting many publications resulting from this
massive international effort); see also Frances Irwin & Janet Ranganathan, Restoring Nature’s Capital: An Action Agenda to Sustain Ecosystem Services (2007). On freshwater
ecosystem services in particular, see Bruce Aylward et al., Freshwater Ecosystem Services, in 3
ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: POLICY RESPONSES 213 (2005) [hereinafter Aylward,
Freshwater Ecosystem Services]; Kate Brauman et al., The Nature and Value of Ecosystem Ser-
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critical factor in long-term sustainability. Hydropower development, by
its nature, changes and controls a river’s previous flow regime.
These three broad trends—climate change, markets, and ecosystems—conflict in at least one essential way; markets in natural resources
require that specific parts of an ecosystem be defined and treated as separate, tradable goods known as commodities. Ecosystems, however,
weaken and function poorly when some of their component parts are
removed or when key relationships are undermined. This conflict turns
on different notions of value and property ownership, and raises some specific questions: By what rules, norms, and practices should economic and
ecological value be determined and measured?16 Who owns water and
energy resources, and in what ways? And, finally, what are the key features of ownership, its powers, and its limits? These questions can be
boiled down to one critical issue: What property rights, rules, and institutions can allow market approaches to water and energy use without destroying
long-term environmental sustainability?
B. Focusing on Hydropower to Understand the Water-Energy Nexus
In this article, I argue that hydropower offers a special perspective
on how to answer this question because hydropower is a physical nexus
between water and electricity systems. Hydropower plays a fundamental role in each of these systems separately but simultaneously. As material substances, water and electricity are so physically different that they
cannot be marketed in the same ways or to the same degrees, yet, in
hydropower, they are stuck together. They are both resources that circulate through larger social and ecological systems and they require separate infrastructures for that circulation.17 These different systems of
circulation lead to a variety of problems that are important in their own
right and are illustrative of the broad question posed above.18
The key in answering this question is to analyze hydropower
along the two different axes of water and electricity.19 In the context of
vices: An Overview Highlighting Hydrologic Services, 3 ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENVT. & RESOURCES
67 (2007).
16. See, e.g., James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000).
17. For a political economic argument that relates the circulation of water to the circulation of value and power, see ERIK SWYNGEDOUW, SOCIAL POWER AND THE URBANIZATION OF
WATER: FLOWS OF POWER (2004) [hereinafter SWYNGEDOUW, SOCIAL POWER].
18. The legal and economic complexities of treating water as energy have a long history. See, e.g., Carol Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common Law Water
Rights, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, 163–96 (1994) [hereinafter Rose, PROPERTY AND
PERSUASION].
19. See infra Parts III, IV, V.
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energy, greater dependence on hydropower is more risky in a changing
climate. Climate change will make water supplies more uncertain, more
variable, and scarcer in many regions, which will undermine power generation. These water supply problems will also affect thermal power
plants because they use a large amount of water in creating steam and in
cooling.20 Under changing climatic conditions, it will be critical for the
electricity sector to better coordinate hydro and thermal power with their
different technical features, trade-offs, and political and economic interests.21 It will also be important to better understand the relationship between large and small hydropower projects, and between dams with
reservoir storage and dams without it (i.e., run-of-the-river dams).22
In the context of water, hydropower has always affected other
water uses—including agricultural, urban, and environmental uses—in
the same river basin, and such effects are inevitable when a dam changes
a river’s flow regime. Some effects on other water users have been positive and some have been negative depending on the design and operation of a given dam. Today, however, in the context of global water
crisis, the relations among different water uses are increasingly critical.
There are growing demands and competition for water at a time of more
erratic and extreme hydrological conditions, which will increase water’s
economic value and the intensity of social and political conflicts. A new
hydropower boom will raise new challenges for water governance and
for integrated water resources management (IWRM)—the current international standards for water reform23—and current progress toward
water sustainability is likely to suffer.
These energy and water problems exist in any legal and regulatory context but they take particular forms when markets are dominant.
Markets mean that property rights and economic value are defined and
measured by the logic of commodities—that is, abstract and quantified
by a common numerical standard. It takes non-market institutions of law
and politics to resolve conflicts over values that are qualitatively different.24 This contrast prompts the specific research questions examined in
this article: How are rivers governed under market-oriented water and
20. DAVID GILLILAN & THOMAS BROWN, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALWESTERN WATER USE 64–70 (1997).
21. See infra Parts IV, V.
22. See infra Parts IV, V.
23. See, e.g., CARL J. BAUER, SIREN SONG: CHILEAN WATER LAW AS A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL REFORM (2004) [hereinafter BAUER, SIREN SONG]; KEN CONCA, GOVERNING WATER:
CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND GLOBAL INSTITUTION BUILDING (2006); World
Bank, Strategic Directions, supra note 10; POSTEL & RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE, supra note 11.
24. CARL J. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT: PRIVATIZATION, WATER MARKETS, AND THE
STATE IN CHILE (1998) [hereinafter BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT]; Carl J. Bauer, Slippery
ANCE IN
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electricity policies? How has the privatization and restructuring of the
electricity sector affected water uses? How are different water and energy uses coordinated in a market framework, and what are the implications for water governance and sustainable development?
I will try to answer these questions by analyzing hydropower in
Chile along the two different axes of water and electricity. The two axes
intersect at hydropower, a nexus between water and energy, and therefore hydropower is regulated from two different directions and for different purposes. Because hydropower is both a use of water and a source
of electricity, it is governed by the laws and regulations of the water
sector and the energy sector. In Chile, as in many other countries, the
two sectors’ laws and regulations are generally not well integrated; they
have different histories, objectives, and subject matter.25 For specific purposes such as hydropower, however, the integration is strong.
An anecdote from my fieldwork may help explain what I am worried about in this article. I have argued in previous work that Chile’s
water law and institutional framework have done a poor job handling
multiple water uses or river basin conflicts.26 In the mid-1990s I was doing research in the Maule River basin in central Chile, interviewing people about how different dams and reservoirs coordinated their
regulation and storage of river flows. My angle was water rights, and I
was studying certain features of Chile’s free-market water law that made
it harder to resolve water conflicts—such as conflicts between farmers
and hydropower companies, as well as conflicts between different power
companies. To my surprise, the managers and professional staff in the
competing power companies were not concerned about the water rights
problems. They relied instead on Chile’s electricity law to coordinate the
many dams there and they were basically satisfied with how that
worked.27
At the time, I mainly understood this observation as evidence that
Chilean water management institutions were weak, and I still think that
argument is true as far as it goes. But in the decade since then, I have
come to worry more about the electricity angle in Chile and around the
world. How does electricity regulation affect water uses and water management? What does it mean for electricity law to govern rivers when
water law fails?
Property Rights: Multiple Water Uses and the Neoliberal Model in Chile, 1981–1995, 38 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 109 (1998) [hereinafter Bauer, Slippery Property Rights].
25. PHILIP RAPHALS, RESTRUCTURED RIVERS: HYDROPOWER IN THE ERA OF COMPETITIVE
MARKETS (2001).
26. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 79–110; Bauer, Slippery Property
Rights, supra note 24, at 109; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23.
27. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 106.
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Why study Chile? Chile is an excellent case to study these questions because Chile has been an international leader and paradigmatic
case of neoliberal law and economics since the late 1970s.28 These characteristics are true both at the macro level and in the specific sectors of
water and electricity. Chile is also a paradigmatic case of national economic dependence on the export of natural resources, making the country especially dependent on ecosystem goods and services in the future.
Finally, Chile’s national electricity system has long depended on hydropower as a primary energy source so the country has a lot of historical
experience with these issues before the current hydropower boom.
In Part II, I describe my analytical framework and approach in a
bit more detail. Parts III and IV then examine hydropower along the two
axes of water and electricity and I discuss, in depth, how each sector’s
laws and regulations affect hydropower development and operation.
Part III focuses on the relationship of hydropower to other water uses,
while Part IV focuses on the relationship of hydropower to other forms
of generating electricity. Part V brings the two sectors together by looking at key examples of how the sectors and their policies have interacted
in recent years, especially since Chile returned to democratic government in 1990. Both Parts IV and V emphasize the perspective of electricity issues, with the relationship between hydropower and thermal power
in the electricity sector as a central organizing theme. Part VI offers concluding remarks.
Because electricity is the primary focus of this article, I look at
hydropower in Chile from the perspective of electricity law and policy
with the goal of explaining this perspective to people who are not electricity experts. This electricity focus also complements my past work, in
which I have analyzed Chilean hydropower from the perspective of
water law and policy.29 In other words, I aim to add the energy half of
the water-energy nexus to my analysis. The reader should bear in mind
that I am a water expert trying to understand electricity, which is no easy
task. My experience in different countries has been that energy experts
know remarkably little about water issues and water experts know remarkably little about energy issues. The two groups speak different technical languages that are daunting to outsiders and they rarely talk to
each other.
Some readers may be surprised that I do not examine Chilean environmental law in this article. The reason is that I think the environmental law has had very little impact on the issues I discuss here. This is by
28. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 1–9; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note
23.
29. See sources cited supra note 26.
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design; Chile’s environmental regulatory framework is intentionally
weaker than the sectoral laws that it is supposed to coordinate. Other
than changing some details, even the country’s Environmental Impact
Assessment process has made little difference for hydropower projects—
although in exceptional cases the process has offered an arena for public
opposition.30
II. FRAMEWORK: GEOGRAPHY, LAW,
AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
Besides my analysis of hydropower as a water-energy nexus
along the two axes of water and electricity, my general framework and
approach draw on several disciplines. Because some of these are interdisciplinary fields in themselves, I will describe them very briefly before
getting into the meat of the article. These fields include geography, law,
and political economy, with a strong historical emphasis running
through all of them. By “historical emphasis,” I mean both the study of
specific empirical cases and also the study of how things change over
time. Property is where these fields overlap most closely, and I focus on
property as a way to bring the fields together and ground them in land,
the natural environment, and water.31
First, geography: The relationship between humans and nature is
one of the oldest and central themes of geography as a discipline. This
relationship, of course, has many aspects and can be studied from the
many angles of bio-physical sciences, social sciences, and humanities.
For me, geography helps to ground the other humanities and social sciences in land and the physical world. A geographic perspective explains
my focus on the different physical characteristics of water and electricity,
and how they influence law and political economy. Geography also sup-

30. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 61–62; Manuel Prieto, El Modelo Chileno
de Gestión Hidroeléctrica: Una Approximación desde la Sustenabilidad Profunda (Nov.
2007) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) (on file with Lo
Contador Library, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) [hereinafter Prieto, El Modelo
Chileno]; Manuel Prieto & Carl Bauer, Hydroelectric Power Generation in Chile: An Institutional Critique of the Neutrality of Market Mechanisms (unpublished paper) [hereinafter
Prieto & Bauer, Hydroelectric Power]; David Tecklin et al., Making Environmental Law for
the Market: The Emergence, Character, and Dilemmas of Chile’s Environmental Regime
(unpublished paper) [hereinafter Tecklin et al., Making Environmental Law].
31. I have discussed my theoretical framework and methods in somewhat more detail
in BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 6–9; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at
8–16.
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ports my focus on the regional contexts and landscapes of rivers and
river basins.32
By law, I mean both law in formal legal terms and also law in
social context—as understood in the broad academic field known as lawand-society studies. Part of this analysis is strictly legal and focuses on
the “law on the books,” as if law were autonomous from society. The rest
of the analysis includes politics, economics, society, and history and aims
to understand the “law in action.”33 This article is structured around two
specific Chilean laws, each of which I discuss in legal, political, economic, and institutional terms. The two laws are the 1981 Water Code
and the 1982 Electric Law.34 The geographic angle is especially evident
within this analysis because the subject matter of these laws involves
land, environment, and natural resources.
By political economy, I simply mean the combination of politics
and economics, which is based on the premise that the two spheres cannot be separated either in the real world or in theory.35 Political economy
overlaps with law-and-society since both fields share a focus on legal
and political institutions in social, economic, and historical context. In
particular, I draw on the related fields of institutional economics and
law-and-economics.36 All these perspectives are needed to understand
markets, property rights, and regulation. Legal rules, social norms, political decisions, and institutional arrangements determine how different
markets work and how economic values are defined. The geographic an-

32. Within geography there have been a variety of approaches to studying water resource management, along the spectrum from bio-physical sciences to social sciences and
humanities. Some important examples focused on water policies and political economy
include Karen Bakker, Neoliberalizing Nature? Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in
England and Wales, 95(3) ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN GEOGRAPHY 542 (2005)
[hereinafter Bakker, Neoliberalizing Nature?]; KAREN BAKKER, AN UNCOOPERATIVE COMMODITY: PRIVATIZING WATER IN ENGLAND AND WALES (2003) [hereinafter BAKKER, AN UNCOOPERATIVE COMMODITY]; SWYNGEDOUW, SOCIAL POWER, supra note 17; James L. Wescoat Jr., Water
Policy and Cultural Exchange: Transferring Lessons from Around the World to the Western United
States, in IN SEARCH OF SUSTAINABLE WATER MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL LESSONS FOR THE
AMERICAN WEST AND BEYOND 1 (2005); Gilbert White, A Perspective of River Basin Development, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1957).
33. See The Law and Society Association, http://www.lawandsociety.org (last visited
July 14, 2009). See also sources cited in BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 138 n.17.
34. See infra Parts III, IV. I do not discuss the 1994 Environmental Law in this article
because it is secondary to the other laws, nor do I discuss the 1980 Constitution, which I
have analyzed in previous publications. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at
11–31; Carl J. Bauer, Derecho y Economı́a en la Constitución de 1980, 2(1) PERSPECTIVAS EN
POLÍTICA, ECONOMÍA Y GESTIÓN 23 (1998) [hereinafter Bauer, Derecho y Economı́a].
35. There are of course many different schools of thought in political economy, but it
is not necessary to sort them all out here.
36. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 138 n.11.
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gle within this context involves the relationship between political economy and the natural environment.
Property is where all these fields come together, and where social
and institutional matters are grounded in land and nature. “Property,” in
the words of C.B. Macpherson, “is an enforceable claim to some use or
benefit of something.”37 Property rights and duties determine the basic
institutional and regulatory framework for markets. These aspects are
especially critical when the things being bought, sold, and traded are
natural resources or ecosystem goods and services. How property rights
are defined and enforced is key in several ways: they determine how
people use, control, and allocate natural resources; they reflect legal, social, political, economic, and historical factors; they both determine and
reflect the distribution of costs and benefits of resource use—that is, who
gains and who loses; and they establish the rules of the game for markets
and other economic activities.38
When discussing specific political and economic forces that have
shaped the Chilean experience of water and electricity markets, my analysis of Chile’s water and electricity laws reflects the country’s broader
historical trends and context. Critical international factors have included
the geopolitics of energy in the Southern Cone and the role of foreign
capital in both water and energy sectors.39
A. Historical Background in Chile: Political and Economic Context
A brief summary of recent Chilean political and economic history
may be useful for some readers.40 Chilean society underwent radical and
violent changes from the 1960s to the 1990s. A moderate reformist government in the 1960s (led by the Christian Democratic Party and President Eduardo Frei Montalva) was followed by a more revolutionary leftwing government (led by the Popular Unity Coalition and President Salvador Allende) from 1970–73. These trends, and the right-wing opposition they triggered, contributed to extreme social and political
polarization that eventually led to a military coup in 1973. The military
government (led by General Augusto Pinochet) held power for more
than 16 years, during which time it thoroughly transformed Chilean social, political, and economic systems. The regime depended on many ci37. PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 3 (1978).
38. There is, of course, a vast literature about property rights. I have cited and discussed some of it. See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24; BAUER, SIREN SONG,
supra note 23. See also Rose, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION, supra note 18; PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS, supra note 37.
39. See discussion infra Part V.
40. See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 3–5, and citations therein.
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vilian advisors to design and implement laws and policies. The military
was careful to institutionalize these changes in new legal arrangements
and a comprehensive Constitution in 1980.
In economic terms, the military government adopted strongly
free-market policies espoused by Milton Friedman and the University of
Chicago Economics Department, where many of the military’s Chilean
economic advisors had studied. Chile became world-famous as a pioneering, and extreme, example of neoliberalism.41
In 1990, Chile finally returned to an elected democratic government. Since then, the country has been governed by a coalition of centerleft political parties known as the Concertación, whose members were political opponents of the military regime. Despite these dramatic political
advances, however, the four successive governments of the Concertación
have had to maintain core elements of the institutional legacy of military
rule—in particular the 1980 Constitution and the neoliberal economic
model. Although these core elements have been modified over the last 20
years, their basic structure and principles are still intact. In the 1980s, the
Concertación committed to play by the Constitution’s rules as a condition
for peaceful democratic transition and all four governments since 1990
have honored that commitment. The Concertación has also had little room
to change economic policies but, in this case, the coalition chose to stick
with a model that they came to consider largely successful and only attempted to reform it around the edges.42
This background helps to explain crucial aspects of contemporary
political debate in Chile over water, electricity, and environmental policy
issues. Political and economic powers are highly concentrated in Chile.
Right-wing political parties and private business interests have a great
deal of power and influence, cemented by the country’s legal and institutional framework.43 In economic and regulatory matters, the government’s authority is quite constrained. Any significant policy reform must
be agreed between the Concertación and its political opponents. These
constraints should be kept in mind as I now turn to the specifics of water
and electricity law and policy.
As I will argue in Parts III and IV, the laws and policies governing
the water and electricity sectors in Chile share the general neoliberal
principles of markets and privatization. Their specific regulatory
41. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 11–31.
42. On the political and economic features of the 1980 Constitution, see BAUER,
AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 11–31; Bauer, Derecho y Economı́a, supra note 34.
The four Presidents of the Concertación have been Patricio Aylwin (1990–94), Eduardo Frei
Ruiz-Tagle (son of former President Eduardo Frei Montalva) (1994–2000), Ricardo Lagos
(2000–06), and Michelle Bachelet (2006–10).
43. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23.
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frameworks, however, are quite different; the water rights framework is
more laissez-faire than the electricity framework. The two sectors use
water for different purposes and, therefore, define property rights to
water in different and sometimes contradictory ways—de facto or de
jure.
B. Chile’s Physical Geography
Chile’s physical geography is unusual and has major consequences for water resources. The country is long and skinny, stretching
along the southwest coast of South America; it is more than 2,500 miles
long from north to south (not including Antarctica, of which Chile claims
a piece) and averages about 100 miles wide from east to west. The Andes
Mountains run down the entire eastern border of the country and the
Pacific Ocean is on the west, which means that Chile has many short,
steep rivers that run west from the mountains to the sea. Because of the
country’s extreme latitudinal range, the climate changes gradually from
very dry in the north to very wet in the south. The central third of the
country lies between these extremes, with a Mediterranean-type climate,
which is characterized by dry summers and rainy winters. For people
familiar with the geography of North America, Chile can be compared to
a 100-mile-wide strip of the Pacific Coast, running from Baja California
to southeast Alaska—but upside down. Central Chile’s climate, where 90
percent of the population lives, is akin to Central California.44
III. HYDROPOWER AND WATER RIGHTS IN CHILE
Chile’s 1981 Water Code is the world’s leading example of a freemarket approach to water law and economics—the textbook case of
treating water rights not merely as private property but also as a fully
marketable commodity. Other countries have recognized variations of
private property rights to water but none have done so in such an unconditional and deregulated a manner as Chile. In the field of international
water policy, the Chilean Water Code has become a paradigmatic example of free-market reform.45
44. See map infra Part IV.B.
45. The Water Code was dictated as Decree with Force of Law 1,122, on October 29,
1981. Much of this Part (III) is adapted from previous works that have more complete
references, extended discussions of the Chilean Water Code, and its international significance. See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 33–50; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra
note 23, at 31–50; Carl J. Bauer, In the Image of the Market: The Chilean Model of Water Resources Management, 3(2) INT’L J. WATER 146, 146–65 (2005) [hereinafter Bauer, In the Image of
the Market]. For studies of Chilean water markets that do not focus on hydropower or river
basin management, see Carl Bauer, Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth: The Political Econ-
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Chile’s approach is notable because water has unusual physical
characteristics that make full private ownership and commoditization
hard to enforce. As a resource, water is both highly mobile—it is often
called “fugitive”—and frequently changes its physical state among the
three different phases of solid (ice), liquid, and gas (water vapor). The
global hydrological cycle works because of water’s unique ability to take
all three physical forms under the range of physical conditions common
on the Earth’s surface.46 These dynamics mean that natural water supplies are inherently variable and uncertain over time, as well as from one
place to another, which weakens the security of private property rights.
Moreover, water uses and transactions inevitably cause impacts on third
parties (also called externalities in economic terminology) because water
systems are so physically interconnected. These constraints on water
commoditization are widely recognized in different fields of law and the
social sciences.47
I will summarize the Water Code’s essential features before focusing on the specific category of “non-consumptive” water rights, which
were created in 1981 and applied to water use for hydropower. I review
the legal and policy problems that have been raised by non-consumptive
rights, especially since Chile returned to democratic government in 1990.
I then conclude by looking at Chile’s recent reform of the Water Code in
2005 and the reform’s likely impact on hydropower in the future.
A. Water Code of 1981: Privatization, Markets, and Institutional
Consequences
Chile’s current Water Code is a classic example of what in Latin
America is often called the “law of the pendulum”; that is, the historical
tendency to swing from one extreme to the other in political and economic affairs without finding a point of balance somewhere in the middle.48 From the Spanish colonial period through the mid-twentieth
century (over 400 years), water legislation in Chile recognized private
rights to use water under some circumstances, even though these rights
were subject to a good deal of public regulation. In 1967, a reformist

omy of Water Rights in Chile, 1976–1995, 25 WORLD DEV. 639 (1997) [hereinafter Bauer, Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth], and Carl Bauer, Results of Chilean Water Markets: Empirical
Research since 1990, 40 WATER RESOURCES RES. 9 (2004).
46. PHILLIP BALL, LIFE’S MATRIX: A BIOGRAPHY OF WATER 27 (2001).
47. See, e.g., Bakker, Neoliberalizing Nature?, supra note 32; Michael Hanemann, The Economic Conception of Water, in CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? (2006); Joseph Sax, The Constitution,
Property Rights, and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (2000).
48. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 33–50; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra
note 23, at 31–50.
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Chilean government swung the pendulum toward greatly expanded
governmental authority over water use and water management—at the
expense of private property rights—by passing a new water law as part
of an ambitious agricultural land reform. In 1981, the military regime
swung the pendulum to the opposite, free-market extreme, where it remains to this day.49
The 1981 Water Code in its original form was in force until certain
aspects were modified in 2005. The 1981 Water Code was written at the
high point of the political influence of a group of radical neoliberal economists. In general terms, the law greatly strengthened private property
rights, increased private autonomy in water use and management, and
favored free markets in water rights to an unprecedented degree. The
Water Code fully separated water rights from land ownership for the
first time in Chilean history and declared them to be freely tradable; they
could be bought, sold, mortgaged, inherited, and transferred like any
other real estate. As a corollary, the Water Code sharply reduced the
government’s role and authority in water resources management, regulation, and development.50
The Water Code’s essential philosophy was laissez-faire because it
did not directly mandate or establish a market in water rights but, instead, set up the legal rules and preconditions for such a market to
emerge spontaneously as a result of private initiative. The law’s basic
principles and institutional framework are both reflected and protected
by Chile’s current Constitution, which was adopted in 1980 by the same
military government that wrote the Water Code. Both the Water Code
and Constitution have remained in effect since Chile’s return to democratic government in 1990.51
In formal legal terms, the Water Code declares that water resources are inalienably public property (bienes nacionales de uso público) to
which the national government may grant private parties the exclusive
rights to use. The government water rights agency is the Dirección General de Aguas (DGA), or General Water Directorate, which is located
within the Ministry of Public Works. Despite this formal definition, the
law actually strengthens private control over water rights and weakens
government authority when compared with previous Chilean legislation. Applicants for new rights do not have to specify or justify their

49. The legislative reform in 2005 changed relatively little, as discussed below. See infra
Part III.C.
50. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 33–50; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra
note 23, at 31–50.
51. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 11–31; Bauer, Derecho y Economı́a,
supra note 34; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 35, 36.
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intended water uses to the DGA, and the agency is required to grant new
rights free of charge if there is water physically available and legally
unclaimed.52
The Water Code does not establish any legal priorities among different kinds of water uses, such as domestic or agricultural uses, because
such determinations are left to private individuals and the free market. If
there is not enough water to satisfy simultaneous applications for new
rights, the DGA has no power to choose among competing applicants.53
Instead, the law requires the agency to hold a public auction and sell the
new rights to the highest bidder, though such auctions have been rare in
practice.
Once they have been granted, water rights are governed by private civil law rather than public administrative law; they are included in
the general system for registering real estate titles and they are explicitly
guaranteed as private property under the Constitution. Moreover, the
current Water Code recognizes and protects all water rights acquired
under legislation prior to 1981. The owners of water rights can freely
change how they use those rights without notifying the DGA or asking
for its administrative approval (with certain minor exceptions). Water
rights owners do not pay any taxes or fees to the government—in this
respect, water rights are not like other real estate. Owners have no legal
obligation to actually use their water rights and, until 2005, they faced no
legal or financial penalty for lack of use. In other words, there is no legal
doctrine requiring a “beneficial use”—popularly known as the “use it or
lose it” doctrine in the western United States and other countries. This
unconditional nature of private water rights differs from all previous legislation in Chile and also differs from the water laws of all other countries around the world. Taken together, these provisions allow
unrestricted private speculation in water rights, which has been one of
the Water Code’s most controversial and criticized features.54
The DGA has very little regulatory authority over private water
use and has no power to settle conflicts between water users. The agency
cannot cancel or restrict existing water rights except by expropriating
them under the Constitution’s property articles, which would require
specific legislation and payment in cash.55 Nearly all decisions about
water use and management are made by individual water rights owners
52. Some of these provisions were modified in 2005, although the changes apply only
to new rights granted after the recent reform took effect. See infra Part III.C.
53. Under exceptional circumstances, the President of Chile can intervene to make
such a choice. See generally Bauer, Bringing Water Markets Down to Earth, supra note 45.
54. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 33–50; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra
note 23, at 31–50.
55. To my knowledge this has never happened.
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or, in the case of irrigated agriculture, by private associations of canal
users. The DGA retains some important technical and administrative
functions, such as gathering and maintaining hydrologic data, inspecting
larger dams and canals, and enforcing the rules governing the operation
of private canal associations. The agency can also prepare studies, reports, and policy recommendations, but these have little or no regulatory
force. The Water Code does not address issues of water quality or environmental protection although, in recent years, the DGA has begun to
work in these areas.
The Water Code’s laissez-faire principles are especially clear in
the areas of river basin management, coordination of multiple water
uses, and resolution of water conflicts. The military government’s primary concern about water law in the 1970s had to do with irrigation
rights, which were a critical part of rolling back the agricultural land
reform that had taken place between 1967 and 1973. As a result, the
Water Code says very little about other non-agricultural water uses or
about how to coordinate them.56 Dealing with these broader water management issues depends on the Water Code’s general free-market principles and institutional framework rather than on specific provisions; in
other words, these issues are to be handled by private bargaining among
the owners of water rights. When private bargaining fails, the only alternative is to go to the ordinary civil courts. This institutional framework
reflects the 1980 Constitution, as well as the Water Code.57
Like most legislation, even legislation adopted by a military government behind closed doors and without public discussion, Chile’s 1981
Water Code was a product of political negotiation.58 This negotiation was
especially important in determining the specific rules defining property
rights and, therefore, the economic incentives affecting water use and
allocation. In most respects, the neoliberal economists who dominated
the drafting of the Water Code got what they wanted: a legal framework
that privatized water rights and favored a free market. They had to yield
on one key point, however, which was the proposed creation of annual
water rights taxes. Although the economists argued that such taxes were
essential to creating the appropriate economic incentives and price signals for efficient water use, agricultural interests marshaled enough political resistance to block the proposal in 1981. Farmers and agricultural

56. The one exception was the creation of non-consumptive water rights, discussed
below. See infra Part III.B.
57. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 79–123; Bauer, Slippery Property
Rights, supra note 24; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 96–117.
58. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 33–40; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra
note 23, at 31–50.
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landowners refused to pay new taxes, regardless of the economic arguments in favor of doing so. Since 1990, however, Chilean politicians and
policymakers have repeatedly debated these legal rules and economic
incentives.59
B. Non-Consumptive Water Rights: Monopoly, Speculation, and
Multiple Water Uses
The Water Code created a new kind of water right, the “non-consumptive” right. These new rights were intended to foster hydropower
development in the upper parts of river basins—in the mountains and
foothills—without harming farmers downstream in the valleys who had
preexisting water rights. A non-consumptive right allows its owner to
divert water from a stream or river and use that water to generate electric power, provided that the water is then returned unaltered to its original channel—though not to the original point of diversion. In this way,
the water continues to flow downstream for use by other water rights
holders.60
By the time the Water Code was enacted in 1981, most of the surface waters in central and northern Chile had already been fully allocated for irrigation as “consumptive” water rights.61 Hence, the invention
of non-consumptive water rights aimed to intensify the uses of water
resources without having to compensate the owners of existing vested
rights and, in theory, without damaging them. Non-consumptive rights
are not strictly limited to hydropower but other non-consumptive water
users have rarely tried to acquire them for uses such as fishing, recreation, or environmental flows. This issue will probably become more important in the future as these other non-consumptive water users try to
assert their interests.
Non-consumptive water rights have caused at least three important political and economic problems in Chile. First, these rights have
been concentrated in the hands of relatively few owners who have enjoyed significant monopoly powers. These owners have been involved
with the electricity sector and political debates over water rights have

59. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 51–73; Bauer, In the Image of the Market,
supra note 45.
60. For more detailed legal analysis of non-consumptive rights, see BAUER, AGAINST
THE CURRENT, supra note 24; Bauer, Slippery Property Rights, supra note 24; BAUER, SIREN
SONG, supra note 23.
61. The legal term “consumptive” was not used before 1981 because all water rights
were assumed to be consumptive. This reflects the historical predominance of agriculture
in Chilean water use. See sources cited supra note 59.
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been closely tied to debates over electricity regulation.62 This concentration of ownership was partly due to the fact that, until the 1980s, nearly
all hydropower water rights—as defined under previous legislation—
belonged to the state-owned National Electricity Company (Empresa Nacional de Electricidad Sociedad Anónima, or ENDESA). Those rights were
included when the military government sold the company to private investors in the late 1980s.63 Another factor was that, in the 1980s, there
were few people who understood or had the resources to act on the new
Water Code’s opportunities for acquiring non-consumptive rights,
which were free for the asking. Since they were a new kind of property
right, non-consumptive rights were available for rivers throughout the
country and insiders were able to accumulate these rights at little cost
and hold onto them for later development or sale.
The second problem, speculation, has been closely related to the
problem of private monopoly power. The Water Code deliberately fostered speculation in several ways: it granted water rights free to private
applicants; it did not require water rights owners to actually use their
rights; and it did not impose any taxes or fees on water rights ownership.
As a result, people who knew how to work the system were able to accumulate unused rights and then wait indefinitely for water’s value to increase. This practice blocked, delayed, or made more expensive the
development of some hydropower projects.
The two problems of monopoly and speculation dominated Chilean political debate about reforming the Water Code for more than a
decade64 and both problems mattered primarily because of their impact
on the national electricity sector.65
The third problem has involved multiple water uses and river basin governance.66 The relationship between consumptive and non-consumptive water rights—that is, between agricultural and hydropower
water users—has been more difficult and conflictive than the Water
Code’s drafters had expected. Due to the physical mobility and interconnectedness of water in general, conflicts between upstream and downstream water users lie at the heart of river basin management.
The legal rules governing the new category of non-consumptive
rights were few and poorly defined. The Water Code established the existence and basic legal definition of these rights, but said little about how
62. See infra Part V.B.
63. See infra Part IV.
64. BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 51–73; Bauer, In the Image of the Market, supra
note 45.
65. See discussion infra Part V.
66. BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 79–123; Bauer, Slippery Property
Rights, supra note 24; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 96–117.
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exactly they could be exercised or what duties were owed to the owners
of consumptive water rights. In the 1990s, a series of water conflicts between irrigators and hydropower companies revealed the Code’s flaws
and incompleteness. These conflicts were over how to manage dams and
reservoirs to regulate the flows of shared rivers—a question of how to
coordinate different water uses. Farmers and power companies have
conflicting seasonal demands for water in Chile; farmers want to store
water during the rainy winter for use during the dry summer growing
season, while power companies want to store water during the summer
to meet high national electricity demands in winter.
These conflicts posed a serious challenge for Chile’s legal and institutional framework. That framework consisted not only of the Water
Code and the DGA, but also the national court system and the Congress
in the broader context of the Chilean Constitution. The framework’s response to the problem was so partial and inadequate that it triggered
major criticisms about Chile’s institutional capacity for integrated water
management and governance.67 The Chilean Supreme Court eventually
ruled in 1993 that the owners of non-consumptive rights could regulate
river flows without the agreement of consumptive rights-holders and
without owing those rights-holders any compensation for damages
caused.68 That legal principle is still in force today, although it has been
widely criticized by Chilean lawyers and Chilean irrigators continue to
challenge it in court.
The important point here is that hydropower has enjoyed preferential treatment in the Chilean water rights system. A recent Chilean
study has demonstrated this preferential treatment in several contexts
that include water and electricity legislation, land use controls, and a
comprehensive analysis of judicial decisions.69 Moreover, in times of
drought and for the sake of national electricity supplies, the Public
Works Ministry has managed several reservoirs that it controls to benefit
hydropower over irrigation.

67. See sources cited supra 59; see also the discussion infra Part IV; Carl J. Bauer, The
Experience of Chilean Water Markets (2008) (presentation at Expo Zaragoza, Water Tribune,
Thematic Week on Economics and Financing: The Role of Market Instruments in Integrated
Water Management) [hereinafter Bauer, The Experience of Chilean Water Markets].
68. See Orrego v. Empresa Eléctrica Pangue (Corte Suprema, May 8, 1993) (Recurso de
Protección (Chile)). This case is discussed in detail in BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra
note 24, at 100–10; Bauer, Slippery Property Rights, supra note 24.
69. Prieto, El Modelo Chileno, supra note 30.
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C. Water Code Reform in 2005
Chile’s legislature finally approved some changes to the Water
Code in 2005, after nearly 15 years of political debate and stalemate.70
The debates were ideologically charged, revolving around fundamental
issues such as the nature of private property, the institutional framework
for markets, and the limits of government regulation. Since Chile returned to democracy in 1990, three successive governments of the Concertación coalition tried to moderate the neoliberal approach of the
Water Code. Over that period, the scope of the government’s proposed
reforms narrowed steadily in response to strong political opposition
from conservative political parties and private sector business interests.
At the same time, the government’s own position on water markets
gradually became more favorable.71
The 2005 reform consists mainly of incremental improvements in
water law and administration designed in response to specific problems
identified in the operation of the 1981 Water Code.72 Some important examples are the provisions to improve water rights title information and
record-keeping, to strengthen management of groundwater, to
strengthen the DGA’s regulatory authority over future grants of water
rights (but not over existing rights), and to begin to address the problem
of minimum ecological flows. The latter two examples bear directly on
future hydropower development.
The most important and controversial change was the establishment of “fees for non-use” (patentes por el no uso), which must be paid to
the government annually by any water rights owner who has not yet put
his or her new rights to concrete use. The goal of these fees is to prevent
private speculation, hoarding, and monopoly of water rights. The fees
were also explicitly designed to apply to non-consumptive water rights
primarily—reflecting the high priority placed on hydropower development—and to effectively exempt most consumptive water rights for
irrigation.73
In the bigger picture and from an international perspective, however, the 2005 reform was decidedly modest.74 It tinkers with the existing
legal rules and institutional framework but barely touches the core principles of private property rights, market forces, and a weak state. River
70. Ley 20,017 (2005) (approving modifications to the Código de Aguas) (Chile).
71. For a detailed analysis of the politics of the Chilean reform, see BAUER, SIREN SONG,
supra note 23, at 51–73, 118–31; Bauer, In the Image of the Market, supra note 45.
72. Bauer, The Experience of Chilean Water Markets, supra note 67.
73. BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 51–73, 118–31; Bauer, The Experience of Chilean
Water Markets, supra note 67.
74. Bauer, The Experience of Chilean Water Markets, supra note 67.
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basin governance and coordination of multiple water uses are similarly
untouched. Hence, the reform does very little to improve the capacity for
integrated water management. In fact, when the reform was finally
passed, it was partly because of Chile’s ongoing electricity crisis, not because of broad political consensus about water policy. The urgent need
to stimulate hydropower development helped to overcome the political
opposition to modifying the water law. Whether the reform will have
much concrete impact on the water rights system or on water governance remains to be seen.75
Since 2005, I have argued that any additional water law reforms
would be politically unlikely in Chile for years to come, notwithstanding
the ebb and flow of political rhetoric.76 Recently several Chilean politicians have spoken out for a more complete reform, sometimes called the
“nationalization” of water, and some government officials have drafted a
constitutional amendment to strengthen the public nature of water.
Much of this debate was due to the national election campaigns in 2009;
the practical importance of these newer proposals is dubious.77
IV. HYDROPOWER AND THE ELECTRICITY SECTOR IN CHILE
In this Part, I look at hydropower along the axis of electricity instead of water. I begin with a brief description of the physical characteristics of electricity and the problems they pose to law and policy. I also
compare and contrast the key technological features of hydropower and
thermal power. Next, I summarize the historical development of hydropower in Chile, consisting of three phases of technological and geographic expansion from the 1930s to the present. Finally, I refer to the
role of thermal power development in this context.
With that background in mind, I turn to the current legal and regulatory framework. I discuss the 1982 Electric Law and its associated regulations—which are still in effect—including the overall structure and
operation of the electricity sector and its different markets and subsectors. Hydropower is so fundamental to the Chilean electricity sector
that electricity law covers it in detail, although the water issues are addressed only in terms of fuel for power generation. I will also summarize
the privatization of ENDESA and the rest of the electricity sector in the

75. For a more positive view of the 2005 reform by the former head of the DGA who
pushed it through, see Humberto Peña, Taking It One Step at a Time: Chile’s Sequential, Adaptive Approach to Achieving the Three Es, in INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT IN
PRACTICE 153–68 (2009) [hereinafter Peña, Taking It One Step at a Time].
76. Bauer, The Experience of Chilean Water Markets, supra note 67.
77. See infra Part V.F.
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late 1980s in order to describe the situation in 1990, when Chile returned
to a democratic government.
A. Water as Fuel: Basic Features of Electricity, Hydropower, and
Thermal Power
As a physical thing, electricity is as strange as water. In a sense,
electricity is not a material substance at all but a form of energy, intimately tied to magnetic forces. It is a secondary form of energy because it
is produced from other primary sources (such as falling water or the
chemical bonds in fossil fuels).78
One of the critical facts about electricity is that there is currently
no technology for storing it on a large scale. Because electricity cannot be
stored, supply and demand must be kept in balance at all times in a
particular power system or grid. Maintaining this balance at all times—
in the face of continual changes in supply and demand—is the principal
task of electricity management. The task is technically difficult and involves large-scale, complex, and dangerous technology and
infrastructure.79
There is one exception: electricity can be stored as water. Reservoirs
hold water at elevations higher than generating stations and can generate power instantly by releasing water downhill. Thus, as long as they
have water, reservoirs can function like huge batteries .
The electricity sector in all countries consists of three subsectors:
generation, transmission, and distribution of power. This three-part division reflects the technology of electricity rather than a particular regulatory approach. Different countries have chosen different approaches to
whether the three subsectors can be owned and regulated separately or
whether they are vertically integrated—owned and controlled by the
same company.80

78. For an example of the mysterious, awe-inspiring nature of electricity as it appeared
in the early decades of its emergence as a modern technology, see the quotation from
Washington’s Union Station, supra Part I.
79. For an overview of electricity technology and regulation, see Timothy Brennan et
al., A Shock to the System: Restructuring America’s Electricity Industry, in RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE (1996) [hereinafter Brennan et al., A Shock to the System]. For more historical accounts, see DAVID BODANIS, ELECTRIC UNIVERSE: THE SHOCKING TRUE STORY OF ELECTRICITY
(2005); Brian Bowers, Electricity, in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY
350–87 (1990); LOUIS HUNTER & LYNWOOD BRYANT, 3 THE TRANSMISSION OF POWER (1991).
80. In this section I draw on several publications by Chilean energy economists and
engineers: Carlos Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica de 1998–1999: Causas, Consecuencias y Lecciones, ESTUDIOS PÚBLICOS 149–92 (Primavera 2000) [hereinafter Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica]; Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, Regulating the Electricity Sector in Latin America, 1(1)
ECONOMÍA 155 (2000) [hereinafter Fischer & Serra, Regulating the Electricity Sector]; RICARDO
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Hydropower is a form of generating electricity and, therefore, it is
in the generation subsector that hydropower’s distinctive features are
most important. Once the power has been generated, it enters the transmission grid and, from there to its final distribution, it is the same as
electricity generated by other means, such as thermal power. In many
countries, however, there is a key distinction between hydropower and
thermal power in the transmission subsector because the two kinds of
generators may be located at different distances from the centers of consumption. In Chile, for example, hydropower plants are often located
relatively far from the centers of consumption and must transmit for
longer distances than thermal plants.
Hydropower and thermal power are different technologies for
generating electricity.81 I analyze four key differences, focusing only on
hydro and thermal power as they completely dominate the Chilean electricity sector. In Chile, alternative sources of electrical energy—such as
wind or solar—have not been developed until quite recently, despite
years of criticism by environmental activists. Nor does Chile have nuclear power (which is also a form of thermal generation, using nuclear
instead of fossil fuels). Both renewable and nuclear alternatives have gotten much more political attention in Chile in the last few years, as the
conflicts over large new dams in Patagonia have intensified.82
The first key difference is that the supply of hydropower’s “fuel”
is naturally more variable and uncertain. Hydropower depends on water
supplies, which depend on rainfall and snowfall and vary over time—
from wet season to dry season, and from wet year to dry year.83 Building
dams and reservoirs can reduce this natural hydrological variability by
PAREDES & JOSÉ MANUEL SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES DEL MARCO REGULATORIO ELÉCTRICO CHILENO: PROPUESTAS PARA UN CAMBIO (2001) [hereinafter PAREDES & SAPAG,
FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES]. For more on international trends in electricity regulation, see
Besant-Jones, Reforming Power Markets, supra note 14; Brennan et al., A Shock to the System,
supra note 79; Rudnick et al., South American Reform Lessons, IEEE Power & Energy Magazine, July/Aug. 2005, at 49 [hereinafter Rudnick et al., South American Reform Lessons]. Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South America, supra note 10; Hugh Rudnick & Juan M.
Zolezzi, Electric Sector Deregulation and Restructuring in Latin America: Lessons to be Learnt
and Possible Ways Forward, 148(2) IEE PROCEEDINGS—GENERATION, TRANSMISSION, AND DISTRIBUTION 180–84 (2001) [hereinafter Rudnick & Zolezzi, Electric Sector Deregulation]. Some
analysts consider the commercialization of power to be a fourth subsector, distinct from
distribution. In this article, however, and reflecting the practice in Chile, I include commercialization in the distribution subsector.
81. See, e.g., Fischer & Serra, Regulating the Electricity Sector, supra note 80; PAREDES &
SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80; Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South
America, supra note 10.
82. See infra Part V.F.
83. In the case of melting glaciers, these water supplies depend on snowfall in previous years or centuries.
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regulating and storing the flow of rivers, but some uncertainty is unavoidable. “Run-of-the-river” dams (centrales de pasada) have little or no
storage capacity, which means they have much less impact on a river’s
flow regime and are more vulnerable to flow variability. In short, hydrological variability is an essential feature of hydropower, and part of the
appeal of hydropower development in Chilean Patagonia is that that region’s rivers have had less variability than those farther north in Chile.
Thermal power plants, in contrast, burn fossil fuels—coal, oil, and
natural gas—to generate electricity. These fuel supplies are less variable
than water over time, at least in physical terms. Their availability depends on political and economic conditions, however, which are especially uncertain and hard to control if the fuels are imported from other
countries. Chile has learned this the hard way in importing natural gas
from Argentina.84 In the cases of coal and oil, international markets are
sufficiently well-developed that supplies have been fairly reliable, although prices vary significantly.
A second difference is the relationship between fixed and variable
costs. Hydropower generally has high fixed costs and low variable costs,
while thermal power is the reverse. Building a dam takes a long time and
requires major capital investment up front. Once it is built, however, the
water resources that drive the turbines are renewable and often cost little
or nothing to the dam’s owner or operator.85 Thermal plants, in contrast,
tend to be less expensive to build but their operators must pay for the
fuel they consume throughout the life of the project. As with the cost of
water, it is law, policy, and accounting practices that determine which
costs are considered fixed and which are considered variable. It is not
always obvious how to draw the line between fixed and variable costs
and, in Chile, this ambiguity has sometimes led to legal and policy
conflicts.86
A third difference is the security of power supply. Because uncertainty of supply is a built-in feature of hydropower, electricity systems
that rely on it must plan accordingly. Law and policy determine what
level of security of supply is required (if any), how much reserve supply
should be maintained, how both hydro and thermal power generation
can help to meet those requirements, and how costs and risks are allocated between them. For example, hydropower plants can provide security in the immediate term because they can be turned on more quickly

84. See infra Part V.A.
85. Whether or not hydropower operators pay some price for their use of water depends on the relevant law and policy; it is not inherent in the technology. In Chile they pay
nothing. See supra Part III.
86. See, e.g., PAREDES & SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80.
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than thermal plants—in this way, hydro is well suited for producing
peaking power. Thermal plants, on the other hand, can provide more
medium to long-term security because they are much less vulnerable to
drought. Policies regarding the roles and relative contributions of hydro
and thermal power generally include rules about how the different generators will be compensated for their services, under what circumstances, and by whom. All of these issues have high stakes and
controversial among technical experts, if not the general public.87
The fourth difference involves environmental impacts and politics. Hydropower dams affect river flows and cause major impacts on
aquatic ecosystems and related land areas. The global debate about large
dams is now decades old and their many benefits and costs—including
social, economic, and environmental impacts—are well known.88 Dams
do not generally cause pollution, although they often affect water quality
by changing water temperature or the transport of sediments. Hydropower is often assumed to not contribute to carbon emissions or global
warming, although some reservoirs release carbon from rotting vegetation. Thermal power plants, on the other hand, cause a great deal of air
pollution and carbon emissions and are a major cause of global warming.
They also consume a lot of water for making steam or cooling
machinery.
These different environmental impacts have different political
consequences. Hydropower and thermal power affect different groups of
people and economic interests, often located in different places. For instance, large dam projects have been matters of national and international controversy, while large thermal projects have typically provoked
more local conflict. On the other hand, thermal power plants have become widely recognized as a major cause of global warming, which may
mobilize a different set of public opponents.
In summary, in a mixed hydro-thermal power system, the two
kinds of generation have different strengths and weaknesses and different functions to play. The key trade-off, as one Chilean expert put it, is
that “hydropower is more efficient but thermal power is more secure.”89
“Efficiency” is mainly understood here in engineering terms rather than
economic terms. The critical policy issue is how to combine the two and,
in this context, hydropower reservoirs are an essential strategic factor.

87. See, e.g., Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica, supra note 80; Fischer & Serra, Regulating the
Electricity Sector, supra note 80; PAREDES & SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80;
Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South America, supra note 10.
88. See supra note 11.
89. Interview with José Manuel Sapag, Consultant and Research Assoc., Univ. of
Chile, Santiago, Chile (Mar. 2, 2003).
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These differences between hydro and thermal power have consequences
for politics, economics, and regulatory governance. Electricity companies
that have different degrees of dependence on hydro and thermal power
have different interests in certain aspects of how the overall sector
works. These different interests apply regardless of whether the companies are public or private, and they apply to the transmission and distribution, as well as generation of electricity.
B. Historical Development and Geographic Expansion of
Hydropower
We can divide the historical development of Chilean hydropower
into three periods: the 1940s to 1960s; the 1960s to 1990; and the 1990 to
present. The overall story is one of steady expansion and integration of a
national electricity system, moving from central Chile southward. The
trend of hydropower development has been steadily increasing for many
decades, without being affected much by the dramatic changes in national political and economic history.
In the first phase, the Chilean government created the National
Electricity Company in 1943 and gave it the long-term mission of carrying out a plan for national electrification. The company, ENDESA, was
proposed by a group of prominent Chilean engineers in the 1930s as a
means of boosting national economic development out of the stagnation
of the worldwide depression.90 ENDESA was a state-owned enterprise
for the next 45 years.91
Hydropower has been at the core of Chile’s national electricity
system since the 1940s. The national electrification plan was based on
two key ideas: to rely heavily on hydropower and to build a transmis-

90. In the 1930s the country’s electricity supplies were limited and new power development had stalled. The infrastructure consisted of small and isolated local systems centered on key cities and industries. The electricity sector was dominated by private
companies, some of them were owned, in part, by foreign capital. In 1940, total national
capacity was 484 megawatts (MW) of which hydropower produced 32 percent and thermal
power the remaining 68 percent. Public service accounted for 38 percent of the total and 62
percent was produced by industries for their own use. The urban areas of Santiago, Valparaiso, and Aconcagua (all in central Chile) accounted for 75 percent of the public service.
See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a en Chile 70 (1993) [hereinafter Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a II]; Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile, Polı́tica
Eléctrica 29–30 (1988) [hereinafter Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile, Polı́tica Eléctrica].
91. ENDESA was a part of CORFO, the National Development Corporation, which the
government established in 1939 after a major earthquake in central Chile caused severe
damage. CORFO played a major role in stimulating economic development in Chile for
decades afterwards.
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sion grid that would unify the country.92 These two ideas were closely
linked because most of Chile’s hydropower potential is located in the
southern half of the country, while 90 percent of the population lived
(and still lives) in the central third. A national grid was necessary to
move electricity from where it was produced to the centers of consumption. This grid would become known as the Central Interconnected System (Sistema Interconectado Central, or SIC). (See Map, above.)
ENDESA followed the national plan for half a century. In its first
two decades, the company focused on building small and medium hydro
projects on rivers in central and southern Chile—the area that would be
covered by the SIC.93 The most important of these projects were the first
dams built on the Maule and Laja rivers, two rivers in south-central
Chile that would be the workhorses of national hydropower for decades
to come.94 Local industries and other power companies also built a few
small hydro projects and, in the 1960s, all of these companies began to
build thermal (coal-burning) power plants as well.95
At the same time, ENDESA steadily expanded and connected local transmission lines in central and southern Chile. By the early 1960s,
ENDESA linked these regional systems together in the grid that formed
the core of the SIC.96 At that point, the SIC’s total thermal power capacity
was less than one third of total hydropower capacity.97 ENDESA continued to expand the grid in later years.

92. The following summary of the national plan is synthesized from Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7; Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector
Energı́a II, supra note 90; Court, La Hidroelectricidad en Chile, supra note 7; Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile, Polı́tica Eléctrica, supra note 90; Revista de Ingenieros, ENDESA:
1943–1993, 132 REVISTA DEL COLEGIO DE INGENIEROS DE CHILE 9 (1993) [hereinafter Revista
de Ingenieros, ENDESA: 1943–1993].
93. These early projects were essentially run-of-the-river power plants. The first dam
to be completed was Pilmaiquén in 1944, in Region X. Its generating capacity was small but
its location showed that ENDESA was paying attention to southern Chile from the
beginning.
94. In the upper parts of each of these two river basins, ENDESA modified natural
mountain lakes so that they worked as reservoirs. Both Lake Maule and Lake Laja have
been managed for the dual purposes of hydropower and irrigation under rules of operation
and water allocation that date from 1947 and 1958, respectively, and are still in force today.
See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24; Bauer, Slippery Property Rights, supra note
24; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23.
95. See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7.
96. See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a II, supra note 90, at 72; Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile, Polı́tica Eléctrica, supra note 90, at 30; Revista de Ingenieros,
ENDESA: 1943–1993, supra note 92.
97. By 1962, for example, the SIC had 12 hydro plants with a total capacity of 549 MW,
compared to two thermal plants with a total capacity of 155 MW. See Comisión Nacional de
Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7, at 98–99 tbls.4-6 & 4-7.
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Chilean hydropower development entered a second phase in the
late 1960s. Over the next 20 years, ENDESA built the country’s first large
hydropower dams in order to meet the steadily growing national demand for electricity.98 ENDESA was still following the original national
electrification plan; the dams were located in areas of central and southcentral Chile that already had some existing hydropower development,
particularly the Maule and Laja rivers, while the far south (Patagonia)
remained untouched. Most of the new projects included some amount of
short-term reservoir storage and all of them were connected to the SIC
from the beginning.
The five biggest dams more than tripled the SIC’s hydropower
capacity in less than 20 years.99 The Maule and Laja river basins produced the lion’s share of that capacity; almost 70 percent in 1987.100 ENDESA managed to build all these projects despite a great deal of national
political and economic instability throughout this period. ENDESA and
Chilectra—another power company101—also built more thermal power
plants, particularly in the 1970s. The SIC’s overall proportions of hydropower to thermal power thereby remained about the same throughout
this period; approximately 70 percent hydro and 30 percent thermal.102
The SIC had nearly 75 percent of the nation’s total installed capacity in the late 1980s.103 Most of the rest was in the separate northern

98. In Chile a “large” power plant, whether hydro or thermal, means about 300–500
MW, which by international standards would probably be considered medium-sized.
99. The first of these projects was Rapel Dam on the Rapel River in Region VI, which
was finished in 1968–70 and had a capacity of 350 MW. Next were El Toro and Antuco
dams in the Laja basin, which were built at and just below the outlet of Lake Laja. They
were finished in 1973 and 1981, respectively, and added 400 MW and 300 MW. After that
came the adjoining Colbún and Machicura dams on the Maule River, which were finished
in 1985 and totaled 490 MW (of which 400 MW were from Colbún Dam). The Colbún
reservoir was required to store some water seasonally for local irrigators, according to a
month-by-month calendar of guaranteed releases, but hydropower was Colbún’s major
purpose. See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24; Bauer, Slippery Property Rights,
supra note 24. Machicura is a smaller reservoir located just below Colbún, which helps to
regulate the flows released downstream.
100. Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7, at 98–99.
101. Chilectra had been a private utility located mainly in central Chile but was taken
over by the left-wing Chilean government in 1970. Like many such nationalized enterprises, Chilectra remained in government hands after the military took power in 1973.
102. In drought years the proportions shifted to about 50/50, as the lack of water forced
an increase in thermal power generation. Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a
I, supra note 7, at 98–99.
103. Nearly all of the SIC’s production went to public service. Industries produced
about 10 percent of the SIC’s total for their own use in equal shares of hydro and thermal.
Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7, at 98–99.

R
R
R

R

R

\\server05\productn\N\NMN\49-3-4\NMN3406.txt

614

unknown

Seq: 32

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

8-JUN-10

15:30

[Vol. 49

power grid, the Northern Interconnected System (Sistema Interconectado
del Norte Grande, or SING).104
This was the situation when the military government privatized
the electricity sector in the late 1980s before the transition to democracy
in 1990, which begins the third phase of national hydropower development.105 Chile’s economic growth continued to be strong after 1990 and
both hydropower and thermal power development expanded fast. During the 1990s, hydro capacity nearly doubled and thermal capacity tripled in the SIC.106 By 2005, ENDESA and other companies had built 15
new hydro projects on rivers throughout the SIC’s area of influence,
from Santiago to as far south as Region X. Four of these dams were added in the Maule River basin alone.107 ENDESA also built the first two
dams on the upper Bı́o Bı́o River, called Pangue and Ralco, which have
triggered international controversies over the environment and indigenous rights. Ralco Dam in particular has large reservoir storage and contains the country’s largest power plant.108

104. The SING differs from the SIC in several fundamental ways. First, the SING is
much smaller, producing and consuming about 20 percent of the total of the SIC. Second,
the mining industry is by far the largest consumer of electricity in northern Chile, and most
of the mining companies have generators to produce their own power. The population in
northern Chile is relatively small. Third, generation depends almost entirely on thermal
power plants rather than hydropower. Northern Chile is a desert and rivers are too small
to offer much hydropower potential. In 1988 the SING’s total capacity was 596 MW. Mining companies had 500 MW of this (84 percent)—all of it thermal power. See Comisión
Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7, at 101–03. In contrast, the SIC’s
capacity at the time was 3,221 MW, nearly 80 percent of which was produced by hydropower. Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7, at 98–99. In 1992
the SING had expanded to 876 MW of installed capacity, with thermal power accounting
for all of the expansion. The SIC’s capacity, meanwhile, had grown to 4,123 MW, nearly 75
percent of which was hydropower. See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a II,
supra note 90, at 58 tbls.4.14, 4.15.
105. I will return to privatization and the political economic context in Part IV.C.
106. See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7.
107. See Centro de Despacho Económico de Carga-Sistema Interconectado Central, Centrales del SIC, http://www.cdec-sic.cl/centrales (last visited Mar. 3, 2006). See also discussion infra Part IV.C.
108. The Bı́o Bı́o River was an obvious target for hydropower development; it is the
longest river in Chile and has the country’s second-largest hydropower potential, surpassed only by the Baker River in Patagonia. ENDESA had studied the Bı́o Bı́o for decades
as a state enterprise before starting construction as a private company in the early 1990s.
See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24; Court, La Hidroelectricidad en Chile, supra
note 7; ENDESA, RECURSOS HIDROELÉCTRICOS DE LA CUENCA DEL BÍO-BÍO (1989); Rodolfo
Von Bennewitz, Recursos Hidroeléctricos de la Cuenca del Bı́o Bı́o, in 18 LA REGIÓN DEL BÍO BÍO,
COLECCIÓN NOSTRA 83–130 (1990). The Frei government pushed for hydropower development in Patagonia in 1995–96; see also Héctor Vera, Disputa Austral, Qué Pasa, June 7, 1999,
available at http://www.quepasa.cl.
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Thermal power development boomed in the 1990s as well, thanks
to new generation technology (called “combined-cycle”) that burned natural gas. Argentina had natural gas to export and Chilean energy companies, with foreign partners, built pipelines across the Andes Mountains.
In spite of the boom in hydropower, thermal power’s share of the SIC
increased from 26 percent in 1989 to 42 percent in 2005.109 The amount of
power generated by gas, however, will go down in the future, as Argentina has cut its exports and Chile’s attention has returned to coal and
hydropower.110
In summary, hydropower in Chile has grown steadily and often
rapidly from modest beginnings in the 1930s. ENDESA increased hydropower development gradually during its first two decades, and then
picked up the pace by building a series of larger projects from the 1960s
to 1980s. At that point, hydropower accounted for two-thirds to threequarters of the central grid’s power supplies. Hydropower’s growth
went hand-in-hand with the geographic expansion of the national transmission grid, which grew to unite the central third of the country.111 After 1990, new hydropower development continued but was partially
eclipsed by the rapid expansion of thermal power plants fueled by natural gas imported from Argentina. For a few years in the late 1990s, it
seemed that the era of hydropower’s dominance in the Chilean electricity sector was at an end. Since 2002, however, Argentina has cut back its
gas exports to Chile, while Chile’s demand for electricity has kept growing. As a result, hydropower has entered a new boom period.112
C. Hydropower and the 1982 Electric Law: Electricity Markets and
the Value of Water
During the 1980s, the military government transformed Chile’s
electricity sector in two steps. The first major legal change was the 1982
Electric Law, which restructured the national electricity sector according
to market principles but did not remove ENDESA from government
ownership.113 The second change was the privatization of ENDESA and
109. Thermal capacity increased from 743 MW in 1989 to 2,289 MW in 1999, with 72
percent of the increase due to gas. Centro de Despacho Económico de Carga Sistema Interconectado Central, Centrales del SIC, http://www.cdec-sic.cl/centrales (last visited Mar. 3,
2006) (compiled by author).
110. See infra Part V.
111. The two southernmost regions in Chile are too far away to be connected to the SIC.
Regions XI and XII each have small, separate electric systems. Comisión Nacional de
Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7, at 103; Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector
Energı́a II, supra note 90, at 59.
112. See infra Part V.
113. Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 1 [DFL 1] (1982) (Chile).
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other electricity companies in the late 1980s. Both changes fit together
and were fundamental aspects of the military government’s neoliberal
economic reforms. I will summarize the privatization process at the end
of this section, because it happened after the enactment of the Electric
Law and the sequence was intentional; however, the reader should assume a privatized electricity sector in the following description of the
regulatory framework.114
The 1982 Electric Law is pro-market but not laissez-faire. In this
sense, it is less dogmatic and deregulatory than the 1981 Water Code,
which is both pro-market and laissez-faire.115 Because the technology of
electricity is complex, dangerous, and capital intensive, an effective regulatory framework is essential for the overall system to work. The Chilean
electricity model shows both sides of the coin: innovative policies to promote market forces and private enterprise, tied to legal and institutional
arrangements in which government regulation is key, especially in setting some prices. Chile’s Electric Law was the first reform of its kind in
the world, pioneering a pro-market path that was later taken by many
other countries, governments, and international organizations.116 But the
model also illustrates that basic insight of institutional economics: rules
come before markets and, therefore, law plays a critical role in determining economic value.117
Many specific aspects of Chile’s electricity law have been modified since 1982,118 but most of its core principles remain in place.119 The

114. In other words, this description applies to the situation from 1990 on, unless otherwise specified.
115. See supra Part III.A. The 2005 reform slightly reduced the Water Code’s laissezfaire characteristics. See supra Part III.C.
116. According to Hernán Büchi, former Finance Minister in the military government:
Here Chile was a pioneer . . . The challenge consisted of generating a system of prices and organization in the electric sector whose price regime
would function ‘as if’ there were competition. It was an exclusively intellectual creative labor, whose core was used later in the systems of telecommunications and drinking water supply.
HERNÁN BÜCHI, LA TRANSFORMACIÓN ECONÓMICA DE CHILE: DEL ESTATISMO A LA LIBERTAD
ECONÓMICA 79 (1993) (author’s translation). See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a & Departamento de Ingenierı́a Industrial, Institucionalidad Regulatoria en el Sector Energı́a (1996);
Fischer & Serra, Regulating the Electricity Sector, supra note 80; Rudnick et al., South American
Reform Lessons, supra note 80; Rudnick & Zolezzi, Electric Sector Deregulation, supra note 80
(comparing the Chilean model with later generations of electricity reform in other countries, especially in Latin America). See also Brennan et al., A Shock to the System, supra note 79
(providing an overview of electricity restructuring that focuses on the United States but
applies more broadly); Besant-Jones, Reforming Power Markets, supra note 14 (for a World
Bank perspective).
117. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 10–30, 131–36.
118. Some examples are discussed infra Part V.
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first of these principles is that markets are the best system for allocating
resources and, for markets to work efficiently, prices must reflect the real
costs of producing and distributing electricity. Price signals should reflect market conditions of supply and demand, and should not be distorted by so-called “political” decisions. Economic differences between
different sources of electricity, such as the contrasting characteristics of
hydropower and thermal power, are assumed to result from “technological neutrality” rather than political choices and, hence, the price signals
about which source to use are assumed to be neutral.120 If the government chooses to subsidize electricity use in some situations, the subsidies
should be designed in such a way that they do not distort market price
signals.121 A related principle is that the law should provide incentives
for private investment to maintain and expand the existing system so
that government investment is not needed. In this way privatization is
tied to markets although the two policies are distinct.122
The Chilean electricity model applies these principles differently
in each of the three subsectors: generation, transmission, and distribution. Because the three subsectors have different economic characteris-

119. I will generally refer to the “electricity law,” although many of the technical details
have been defined in subsequent regulations rather than in the legislation itself. This section is synthesized from multiple sources. See La Regulación del Sector Eléctrico: La Experiencia Chilena, in DESPÚES DE LAS PRIVATIZACIONES: HACIA EL ESTADO REGULADOR 281 (1992)
[hereinafter Blanlot, La Regulación del Sector Eléctrico]; Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El
Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7; Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica, supra note 80; Ronald Fischer &
Alexander Galetovic, Regulatory Governance and Chile’s 1998–1999 Electricity Shortage (World
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2704, 2001) [hereinafter Fischer & Galetovic, Regulatory Governance]; Fischer & Serra, Regulating the Electricity Sector, supra note 80; PAREDES
& SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80; ALEJANDRO VERGARA, DERECHO ELÉCTRICO (2004) [hereinafter VERGARA, DERECHO ELÉCTRICO]. In addition to these references, I
rely here on interviews in recent years with a half-dozen prominent Chilean energy experts, including academics, government advisors and officials, and private consultants.
120. See supra Part IV.A. Cf. sources cited supra note 119.
121. For example, if the government wants to help poor people with their electricity
bills, it should transfer funds to pay the bills at the going rate, rather than lowering prices.
This is the policy that Chile has followed for drinking water supply.
122. Alejandro Vergara, a Chilean expert on water and electricity law, has disagreed
with my statement that the Water Code is more laissez-faire than the Electric Law. He
thinks it is the reverse because decision-making in the electricity sector depends on private
initiative and capital, and cannot be ordered by government regulators: “The hand of state
authority is more distant in the electric sector than in water.” A. Vergara, comments at
author’s lecture, Diego Portales Univ. Law School, Santiago, Chile (July 20, 2009). His point
is well taken, but I think he is underestimating the political nature of the basic legal rules of
the game, particularly the fact that regulation determines prices much more than is the case
for water rights.
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tics, each can be regulated or deregulated to different degrees.123
Generation is the subsector that is most amenable to markets and competition, while both transmission and distribution are natural monopolies
that require stronger government regulation. Generation is also the subsector in which hydropower is the most important and, in this context,
key aspects of electricity policy have been designed around hydropower,
including assumptions about the value of water.
The Electric Law established three distinct markets for buying and
selling electricity, which are called the “regulated,” “unregulated,” and
“spot” markets.124 Each of these markets plays different roles in the overall operation of the electricity sector and, according to the law, each market’s prices are determined in a different way. The law also established a
centralized power pool to coordinate all of the generating plants that are
part of the central grid—the SIC. This pool includes both hydro and thermal power plants.125 A basic tenet of the Electric Law is that the SIC, as a
whole, has to minimize its short-term marginal costs of generation—that
is, the cost of producing an additional unit of electricity.
The new system of prices and markets was accompanied by a new
regulatory framework. This framework involved transferring some of
ENDESA’s traditional powers and duties to three new organizations: the
National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, or CNE); the
Regulator of Electricity and Fuels (Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles, or SEC); and the Economic Load Dispatch Center (Centro de
Despacho Económico de Carga, or CDEC). The CNE, located in the Ministry
of Economy, is the lead agency that is in charge of doing studies, setting
some prices according to specific formulas, resolving certain kinds of
conflicts, and proposing new rules and policies. The CNE, however, has
no regulatory power over a private company’s actions or investments.
The SEC is the government’s enforcement arm; it is responsible for monitoring electric companies’ compliance with the law and can impose fines.
The CDEC operates the SIC’s power pool, according to regulations, but
is not a government agency. Instead, the CDEC’s directors represent the

123. In 1982 this approach was an international innovation. Nearly all other countries
operated and regulated the electricity sector as a vertically integrated system, as was the
case with ENDESA. See sources cited supra note 113.
124. See, e.g., Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica, supra note 80; Fischer & Serra, Regulating the
Electricity Sector, supra note 80; PAREDES & SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80;
Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South America, supra note 10. See also sources cited supra
note 119.
125. The power pool is a crucial part of the system, intimately tied to the spot market,
and I discuss them in more detail in Part IV.C.1.
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principal power companies. The CDEC’s legal status is unusual, as it is
an autonomous, public/private hybrid organization.126
The regulated and unregulated electricity markets involve transactions between generators and distributors; distributors then deliver
power to consumers—or end users. The unregulated market consists of
the larger consumers of electricity, such as industries and major infrastructure. In the original 1982 legislation, these “large clients” were defined as those using more than two megawatts (MW) per year. Large
clients negotiate prices directly with generators. The assumption is that
these clients have enough bargaining power to protect their own interests without the need for additional government intervention.
The regulated market is based on regulated prices called “node
prices” (precios de nudo), which apply uniformly throughout the entire
SIC.127 In this market, which includes smaller consumers and the general
public, the CNE sets the prices that generators can charge distributors.
Thus, distribution companies buy power from generators through medium-term to long-term contracts at the established node prices. The
CNE sets node prices every six months by calculating the overall system’s average marginal cost of producing electricity over the following
four-year period. The CNE’s methods are specified by law, so the power
companies can also calculate the node prices by the same means.
The four-year period was chosen in order to smooth out the seasonal and annual variations of hydropower production since these variations have a major impact on the system’s costs of operation. The CNE’s
calculations include some factors that are uncertain and must be estimated—for example, the future variability of water supplies and the production of future power plants—even if these are not yet under
construction. The prices do not include environmental costs.128
The CNE’s ambivalent position is one of the curious aspects of the
Chilean model. In certain specific areas the CNE’s power is strong—as in
setting node prices—but, in general, its discretionary authority and free-

126. The CDEC was created by regulations in 1985 in order to implement this aspect of
the 1982 legislation. See Hugh Rudnick, Un Nuevo Operador Independiente de los Mercados
Eléctricos Chilenos, 101 ESTUDIOS PUBLICOS 1 (2006). The websites of all three organizations
are useful as well.
127. Node prices are much less important in the SING because most power consumption in the SING is by large clients, hence unregulated, rather than the public. See sources
cited supra note 107.
128. See, e.g., Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica, supra note 80; Fischer & Serra, Regulating the
Electricity Sector, supra note 80; PAREDES & SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80;
Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South America, supra note 10. See also sources cited supra
note 119.
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dom to move are strictly limited.129 For example, the CNE prepares and
maintains an official list of “planned projects” (plan de obras) that includes
their expected power generation and the timetable for starting operation,
which, as noted above, the CNE incorporates into its calculation of node
prices. However, the CNE’s list is not binding. Private companies are
free to decide whether and when to build any of the planned projects, or
other projects that are not on the list. These are strategic corporate decisions and are an important part of companies’ political leverage over the
government. Companies know how the CNE calculates node prices and,
therefore, they can figure out what impact a particular project will have
on those prices; for example, the SIC’s overall marginal costs go down
for awhile after a large new hydropower plant begins operation.
1. The Spot Market and the Power Pool
The spot market is the third of the electricity sector’s three markets. The spot market is essential to operating the power pool, which
itself is essential to the day-by-day operation of the entire national grid.
The spot market involves generators only. Unlike the two markets described above, between generators and distributors, in the spot market
different generators buy and sell power among themselves at a spot
price, which is set to equal the marginal cost of operating the system as a
whole at a given time. Generators buy or sell on the spot market depending on whether they have less or more power than they need to supply
their own clients at that time.130 Both the spot market and the power pool
are administered by the pool operator, the CDEC.
As I mentioned above,131 the Electric Law requires the SIC to minimize its overall short-term marginal costs of power generation. The SIC
is required to minimize these system-wide costs regardless of the impacts on particular generators, and the CDEC is the organization responsible for implementing this policy. The CDEC monitors the costs of
operating each generating plant, as well as the costs of operating the grid
as a whole. As the SIC’s demand for electricity increases, the CDEC orders additional generators to produce power in order of their marginal
costs—their operating costs at that moment. The generator with the lowest marginal cost is the first to produce, up to the limits of its capacity,
and then generators with successively higher marginal costs are brought

129. This is very similar to the DGA in the field of water rights, as discussed supra Part
III.
130. See sources cited supra note 128. See also sources cited supra note 119.
131. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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on line one by one, as needed to meet the increasing demand. The sequence is reversed when demand goes down.132
In issuing these dispatch orders, the CDEC may not consider
which companies own the different generating plants or what their contractual obligations to their clients might be. This means, that at any
given time, some companies produce more power than they need to supply to their own clients and other companies produce less than they
need. The purpose of the spot market is to let companies sort out the
discrepancies, while maximizing the efficiency of the system as a whole.
In theory, this should be to everyone’s benefit; for companies whose generators are less efficient, it is cheaper to buy surplus power from more
efficient generators than to produce their own.
2. Coordinating Hydropower and Thermal Power in the Pool
Operating the power pool is tricky in a mixed hydro-thermal system like Chile’s because of the shifting range of costs.133 Run-of-the-river
hydropower plants have the lowest operating costs. Since the water
flowing by or through them cannot be stored, it must be used or it is lost.
As a result these generators are always operating whenever there is
water. They provide part of the SIC’s baseline power supplies. Under
Chilean water law, there is no cost for this water,134 although in some
cases the dam-owner may have had to buy water rights from another
private party or in a DGA auction.
Thermal generators are the next to be brought on line if demand
goes up, ranked in order of their costs of operation. These costs depend
on the cost of different fuels and on the generators’ technical efficiency in
burning them. Natural gas has generally been the cheapest fuel, followed
by coal, and oil or diesel is the most expensive.
The key to the whole system, however, is the third type of generator: hydropower dams that have reservoir storage. These dams can replace thermal generation under certain circumstances. At any given time,
these dams can either produce power with their stored water or store
water for power production in the future. When they produce power,
their operating costs are low and they replace some of the SIC’s thermal
generation; when they store water instead, the SIC must use more thermal generation and total costs go up. In this way, how to manage reservoirs is a crucial strategic decision for the country’s electricity sector.135

132. See sources cited supra note 128.
133. See sources cited supra note 80; Rudnick et al., A Delicate Balance in South America,
supra note 10. See also sources cited supra note 119.
134. See supra text accompanying note 85.
135. See supra note 133.
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The CDEC’s decisions about how to operate such reservoirs are
not autonomous or discretionary. Instead they depend on a mathematical model, specified by law and regulations, which includes a number of
variables. Some of these variables are inherently uncertain because they
involve estimates about what will happen in the future. The major variables include: how much water is available in the reservoirs; whether it
is a wet year or a dry year; whether wet or dry conditions are expected in
the future; what are the operating costs of thermal power (both present
and future); and what new power plants are planned for the future.
Many of these same factors, of course, also affect how the CNE determines node prices.136
For example, in a wet year when water is abundant, run-of-theriver dams produce more power and the CDEC orders more generation
from the dams with storage. This additional hydropower generation
lowers the system’s overall marginal cost and, hence, lowers the price on
the spot market. This trend takes the more expensive thermal plants out
of production and the companies with dams sell their surplus power to
thermal plants on the spot market. In dry years it is the reverse, more
thermal generation is required and hydropower generators must make
up their deficit by buying power from thermal generators. According to
one estimate, hydro can supply 100 percent of the SIC’s demands in wet
years, 80 percent in normal years, and 40 percent in dry years.137
These relationships have often caused conflicts between different
power companies—especially in drought years. Different companies
have different economic interests according to their relative dependence
on hydro or thermal power generation, and they have taken different
legal positions about who should compensate whom, under what circumstances, and at what price.138
Hydropower’s strategic importance in Chile has also been codified in the SIC’s day-to-day operations through the management of Lake
Laja in south-central Chile. This lake is the source of the Laja River, the
largest tributary of the Bı́o Bı́o River, which is itself the country’s longest
river with the second-highest hydroelectric potential.139 Lake Laja is by
far the largest reservoir in Chile and the only one big enough to store
water from more than one year’s river flow, which makes it the “reserve
battery” for the entire central grid. It is also the center of the electricity

136. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 128 (explaining how the CNE determines
node prices).
137. Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica, supra note 80, at 155.
138. Id.; PAREDES & SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80. I return to these
issues of regulatory governance infra Part V.
139. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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price system because the CDEC uses a mathematical model of the lake’s
water levels to calculate the SIC’s overall marginal costs—including estimates of the trade-offs (opportunity costs) involved in using water now
versus storing it for later. These marginal costs in turn determine the
timing and amount of thermal generation.140
3. Summary: Water and the Electricity Law
Two points should be clear from this review of Chilean electricity
law and regulations. The first is that the electricity law pays close attention to water resources as a critical input into the national electricity system. The second is that this close attention is focused entirely on
generating electricity—for which water is fuel—and does not consider
other aspects of water rights or water management.
From the perspective of integrated and sustainable water management, these two points have both positive and negative sides. The positive side is that the CDEC as a whole, as well as individual dams and
reservoirs, could readily adjust their operations to fit new rules of water
use. Such adjustments will obviously have some impact on power production, but the engineers who run the country’s electricity system are
fully capable of executing different rules of operation. In practice, that is
what they already do in the cases of Lake Laja and Lake Maule; each lake
is managed according to decades-old legal agreements that specify how
the waters can be used for both hydropower and irrigation, and the
CDEC takes these agreements as given when it orders different power
plants to turn on and off.141 In theory, new rules for environmental flows
or other purposes could work the same way.
The negative side is that the electricity sector’s narrow consideration of water issues is built deeply into the current system. A good illustration is how water’s economic value is determined—that is, how water
is given a price. For the calculations of the CNE and CDEC, the value of
water is defined as the opportunity cost of water stored in reservoirs,
compared to other costs of power generation. In times of drought, this
opportunity cost increases to equal the cost of producing an additional
unit of electricity by thermal power. If there is no drought, however, the
opportunity cost of stored water goes down and is defined as the cost of

140. For more technical explanations of this model, see Comisión Nacional de Energı́a,
El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7, at 368–72; Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica, supra note 80, at
157–61. For more background on Lake Laja, see BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note
24; Bauer, Slippery Property Rights, supra note 24.
141. In both cases these agreements are decades older than the current water and electricity laws, but they have been grandfathered in. See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra
note 24.
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producing an additional unit by hydropower.142 The price of water, in
other words, depends on the costs of energy and on hydrological estimates, but it does not reflect other demands or uses for water. This omission is remarkable in a country famous for the market economic
principles of its water rights system.143 Institutional economics can help
us understand this problem, since it is evidently legal rules and political
decisions that have shaped market price signals by determining which
costs are included and who pays them.144
4. Privatization of the Electricity Sector and Situation in 1990
Privatization was the final step of the military government’s restructuring of the electricity sector. The market-oriented framework described above was designed and implemented when the Chilean
government still owned the entire sector, including generation, transmission, and distribution. Only when the sector had been restructured, in
the mid- to late-1980s, did the military government privatize ENDESA
and Chilectra—although privatization had always been part of the overall plan for reform. The military government was careful to complete the
process before leaving office in 1990.
The privatization was done in several stages over a period of several years.145 The government first divided ENDESA and Chilectra into a
number of different companies and subsidiaries, which were again divided among the three subsectors of generation, transmission, and distribution. Ownership shares in these companies were then sold separately
to a combination of different buyers.146 These new owners and managers
142. Interviews with Eduardo Saavedra, Universidad Alberto Hurtado, in Santiago,
Chile (July 2003).
143. See supra Part III.
144. I return to this argument in the Conclusion, infra Part VI.
145. For more detailed accounts of the process of electricity privatization, see Eduardo
Bitrán & Raúl Sáez, Privatization and Regulation in Chile, in THE CHILEAN ECONOMY: POLICY
LESSONS AND CHALLENGES (1994) [hereinafter Bitrán & Sáez, Privatization and Regulation in
Chile]; Blanlot, La Regulación del Sector Eléctrico, supra note 119; Comisión Nacional de
Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a II, supra note 90, at 74–76; DOMINIQUE HACHETTE & ROLF LÜDERS,
LA PRIVATIZACIÓN EN CHILE 216–33 (1992); CARLOS HUNEEUS, EL REGIMEN DE PINOCHET
437–98 (2000); Revista de Ingenieros, ENDESA: 1943–1993, supra note 92. See also HUGO
FAZIO, MAPA ACTUAL DE LA EXTREMA RIQUEZA EN CHILE (1997) for a more critical view from
the left.
146. The new owners included private investors, institutional investors (that is, Chile’s
privatized pension funds), groups of ENDESA’s employees, and members of the armed
forces. Despite the diversity of shareholders, the new companies were controlled by a small
group of investors by means of rather intricate arrangements of stock ownership. See Bitrán
& Sáez, Privatization and Regulation in Chile, supra note 145; Blanlot, La Regulación del Sector
Eléctrico, supra note 119; Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a II, supra note 90;
HACHETTE & LÜDERS, supra note 145; HUNEEUS, supra note 145; FAZIO, supra note 145.
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had strong political ties to the military government. Many of them had
worked in that government as civilians and had helped to design and
implement the electricity sector reforms—including the privatization
process. During this early phase, the role of foreign investors was
limited.
By 1990, three private companies dominated the generation subsector. The newly private ENDESA owned all of the company’s hydropower facilities throughout Chile, with the sole exception of the
adjoining Colbún and Machicura dams on the Maule River.147 In addition, ENDESA’s private assets included all the water rights, technical
studies, and hydrological data that the company had accumulated during its 45 years as a government enterprise. Colbún and Machicura dams
had about 15 percent of the SIC’s generating capacity and were owned
by a separate company named Colbún.148 Colbún remained in government ownership for the time being. The idea was to privatize Colbún a
few years later but to keep it independent from ENDESA in order to
promote more competition within the electricity sector.149 Chilectra was
divided into a generation company, Chilgener,150 which owned most of
the SIC’s thermal power plants, and two distribution companies. Since
Chilgener was sold to different investors from those who bought ENDESA, the two private companies became major competitors in the generation market.
Each of the three competing companies has had different shares of
the generation market and different degrees of dependence on hydropower and thermal power, although the proportions changed somewhat
over the course of the 1990s. ENDESA is by far the largest of the three,
with over 50 percent of the SIC’s installed capacity, and it is also the
most dependent on hydropower, which has produced about 90 percent
of its electricity. Colbún had about 15 percent of the SIC’s capacity during the 1990s. At first, all of Colbún’s power generation came from its
two dams but by the end of the decade the company had built a large
gas-fired thermal plant that reduced its dependence on hydropower to

147. ENDESA owned the three dams that were supplied by Lake Laja, which had more
total generation capacity than Colbún-Machicura, as well as much greater reservoir storage. Supra note 94 and accompanying text. In addition, in 1990, ENDESA was building
Pehuenche Dam upstream from the Colbún dam, and would soon start building Pangue
Dam on the Bı́o Bı́o. Supra note 104 and accompanying text.
148. I will use Colbún to refer to the company, and not the Colbún and Machicura
dams, throughout the rest of the article.
149. The Concertación government eventually sold its majority stake in Colbún later in
the 1990s.
150. Chilgener was renamed Gener later in the 1990s and then renamed AES-Gener
after the U.S. utility AES acquired a major stake.
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two-thirds. Gener, formerly Chilgener, was the contrasting case as its
generating capacity was only slightly larger than Colbún but it depended
heavily on thermal power. Gener had over 20 percent of the SIC’s capacity in the 1990s, and 70–80 percent of the company’s power was generated by coal and natural gas.151
The SIC’s transmission grid belonged to a new company named
Transelec, which was a regulated monopoly under Chilean electricity
law. ENDESA owned this company, too, until Chile’s Anti-Monopoly
Commission152 recommended that ENDESA sell Transelec in the late
1990s. The buyer was the large Canadian power company Hydro
Quebec.
In short, when the Concertación government took office in 1990,
Chile’s electricity sector had been restructured, divided into separate
components, and privatized. Much of this was done according to principles of market economics and competition, but the military government
allowed some exceptions that led to large areas of private monopoly
power. In practice, ENDESA and its new owners continued to control
many of the sector’s separate components, particularly in generation and
transmission. Although ENDESA was no longer a government enterprise, it remained quite vertically integrated, and the new owners and
managers had strong political ties to the military government.
V. NEXUS OF WATER AND ELECTRICITY POLICIES SINCE 1990
In this final part, I return to the idea of hydropower as a nexus
between water and electricity153 by describing several examples of the
relationship between water and electricity policies. It is important to note
that the first real test of the military government’s electricity reforms
came after the military had returned to the barracks. Although the reforms of the early 1980s had foreseen and prepared for the sector’s eventual privatization, the new regulatory framework had never dealt with
large private electricity companies until the return to democratic government. Thus, a sharp increase in private economic power coincided with a
marked weakening of the central government’s political authority.

151. The data for the SIC’s installed capacity refer only to public service and do not
include industry’s power generation for its own consumption. In the SIC, however, public
service accounts for 90 percent of power consumption. Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El
Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7; Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Electrico, supra note
3.
152. See Fiscalı́a Nacional Económia, http://www.fne.cl/?content=antimonopolio (last
visited Apr. 28, 2010).
153. See supra Part I.
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A. The Rise and Fall of Argentine Natural Gas, the Fall and Rise of
Chilean Hydropower
The Concertación government was in a difficult energy situation in
the early 1990s. Many people in the Concertación disagreed with the military government’s electricity policies either because of those policies’ neoliberal principles or because of how the policies had been carried out.
The privatization of ENDESA was especially controversial. Many Chileans were proud of the company’s past accomplishments as a public enterprise working for national development, and objected to its becoming
a source of private profit—particularly on terms so advantageous to the
new owners. For many of these people, privatization was a bitter pill to
swallow because of its strongly political flavor—ENDESA’s new owners
and managers were closely tied to the military.154 On the other hand, the
Concertación had committed itself to respecting the legal and political
rules as well as the economic model that the military and their rightwing allies had put in place. That was the price of a peaceful democratic
transition. The new government prized political stability and economic
growth very highly; this meant that its room to maneuver in electricity
policy was quite limited.155
In the early 1990s, therefore, ENDESA was flying high. The company was earning record profits in Chile and had started to expand internationally, buying electricity companies in neighboring Argentina and
other Latin American countries that were then privatizing their own
government-owned electricity sectors.156 Gener was less dominant but
was also investing internationally, including buying large shares in both
thermal and hydropower plants in Argentina. Chile’s new government
was concerned about ENDESA’s monopoly powers and vertical integration—and, hence, the lack of competition—but the government was still
studying the situation and had not yet decided on its strategy for
reform.157
By the mid-1990s, the Chilean government was attempting legal
and regulatory actions to limit ENDESA’s market power—actions that
were largely unsuccessful. At the same time, the government also
strongly supported the importation of natural gas from neighboring
154. See Bitrán & Sáez, Privatization and Regulation in Chile, supra note 145; Blanlot, La
Regulación del Sector Eléctrico, supra note 119; Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector
Energı́a II, supra note 90; HACHETTE & LÜDERS, supra note 145; HUNEEUS, supra note 145;
FAZIO, supra note 145.
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. Revista de Ingenieros, ENDESA: 1943–1993, supra note 92.
157. See Blanlot, La Regulación del Sector Eléctrico, supra note 119; Comisión Nacional de
Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a II, supra note 90.
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countries as a tool to increase competition and supplies in the energy
sector. This was a new alternative and, thanks to recent advances in the
technology of turbines, thermal power plants could use natural gas to
generate electricity more efficiently than before. Moreover, Argentina
had restructured and privatized its own national energy sector in the
early 1990s under the government of President Carlos Menem. This restructuring created incentives for companies in Argentina to increase the
production and export of natural gas to Chile.
To export this gas, pipelines across the Andes Mountains from
western Argentina to several locations in northern, central, and southern
Chile had to be built. The governments of Chile and Argentina signed an
international treaty in 1995 to encourage these projects as part of the integration of the two countries’ energy sectors. There was fierce competition among different Chilean energy companies, each with different
foreign and multinational partners, over which pipelines and where they
would be built.
For several years this strategy worked well and Chile seemed to
have entered a new era of declining reliance on hydropower. Chile’s
thermal power generation capacity tripled during the 1990s and continued to grow faster than hydropower after 2000.158 The natural gas boom
lowered prices in both the regulated and unregulated electricity markets.
Most new hydropower projects could not compete in this context. ENDESA and other companies postponed their plans for new hydro
projects, the largest of which were in southern Chile, although ENDESA
continued to build Ralco Dam on the Bı́o Bı́o River. Chilean energy experts agreed that other hydro projects would likely remain on hold for at
least the next 10 years. In 1997, for example, the head of the CNE said
that “the introduction of natural gas . . . is going to change the economic
structure of our country.”159
The new era turned out to be short. Argentina’s government and
economy collapsed in December 2001, President Fernando De la Rúa resigned in the crisis, and the national currency was devalued to one-third
of its previous value—vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. This crisis soon had an
impact on the Chilean energy sector as the new Argentine government
began to restrict the export of natural gas. The Argentine government’s
priority was to safeguard supplies of gas for domestic consumption, with

158. See Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a I, supra note 7.
159. Interview with Alejandro Jadresic, El Racionamiento Era el Último Recurso, EL MERCURIO, June 17, 1997.
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Argentine consumers paying in devalued pesos.160 Since 2002, Argentina’s gas exports have declined in volume and have become much less
reliable. Chile has been scrambling to replace them ever since and Chilean protests that Argentina was violating their 1995 international treaty
have been unsuccessful.
Argentina’s crisis meant that hydropower development in Chile
shifted from low priority back to high priority abruptly. Plans for hydro
projects that had been shelved were dusted off in a hurry, suddenly
reappearing on center stage with a new sense of urgency. In retrospect,
the natural gas boom was a brief and exceptional interlude rather than
the start of a long-term trend.
Beyond Argentina, the geopolitics of energy in South America did
not favor Chile. Both Bolivia and Peru, Chile’s other neighbors, have
abundant natural gas and a history of poor relations with Chile that
dates back to the nineteenth century. For political reasons, therefore,
both countries have rejected the idea of exporting gas to Chile, in spite of
Chilean power companies’ willingness to pay a world market price for it.
B. Water Rights and Monopoly Power
The natural gas boom affected water rights issues as well. ENDESA’s concentrated ownership of water rights for hydropower has
been widely criticized—even by people who supported the privatization—since the company was privatized.161 The military government included ENDESA’s water rights in the assets when the company was
sold. Those rights not only included the water rights pertaining to existing dams, but also those rights that had not yet been used, such as
potential dam-sites that were still undeveloped. Chilean governments,
since the 1940s, had granted water rights to ENDESA as needed for its
projects free of charge. Under the 1981 Water Code, while ENDESA was
still government-owned, the company requested and was granted new
non-consumptive rights for rivers throughout the country.162
Until 2005, the Water Code did not impose any costs or fees on the
owners of water rights, nor did these owners have any legal obligation to
use their rights.163 Many Chilean energy experts criticized the Water
Code for allowing the ownership of water rights to function as a barrier

160. Argentine energy companies would have preferred to keep selling their gas to
Chile at international market prices—three times the price in Argentina—but they could
export only the amounts that the government allowed.
161. See, e.g., Instituto de Ingenieros de Chile, Polı́tica Eléctrica, supra note 90, at 48.
162. See supra Parts III.A and III.B; BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24; Bauer,
Slippery Property Rights, supra note 24; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23.
163. See supra Part III.C.
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to entry into the market for electricity generation—in other words, water
rights were a tool for reducing competition and strengthening monopoly
powers.164 Because water rights owners and speculators could keep their
rights indefinitely without using them or paying anything for them,
other companies were blocked from building new hydropower projects.
This barrier restricted electricity supply and raised prices to the benefit
of existing generators, including ENDESA.165 Most analyses of Chilean
electricity regulation in the 1990s refer to the problem of water rights and
monopoly power.166
Beginning in 1996, the Chilean government made this issue one of
its core arguments for reforming the Water Code.167 With the growing
imports of Argentine natural gas, however, competing power companies
could build new thermal power plants wherever there were gas pipelines, effectively making water rights a much less important barrier to
competition in the electricity sector. This factor weakened the DGA’s argument in favor of Water Code reform, apparently since the CNE no
longer considered it important. During this period ENDESA was also
embroiled in a long-running dispute with the DGA about new water
rights. For years the DGA refused to approve ENDESA’s requests for
new rights in southern Chile, arguing that granting the rights would increase the company’s dominance of the market for hydropower generation. ENDESA countered that the DGA had no authority over issues of
market competition and monopoly since those areas were regulated by
Chile’s Anti-Monopoly Commission. That Commission ruled in favor of
the DGA in a landmark decision in 1997.168
The Water Code reform was finally approved in the last year of
President Ricardo Lagos’s administration, at a time when there were declining gas supplies from Argentina. The government’s right-wing opponents finally agreed to remove water rights speculation as a possible
obstacle to rapid hydropower development.169

164. See Hugo Altomonte, Sı́ntesis del Estudio de Caso sobre Chile, in PROYECTO OLADE/
CEPAL/GTZ: ENERGÍA Y DESARROLLO EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (1996); Blanlot, La
Regulación del Sector Eléctrico, supra note 119; Bitrán & Sáez, Privatization and Regulation in
Chile, supra note 145; Comisión Nacional de Energı́a, El Sector Energı́a II, supra note 90.
165. Recall that node prices went down temporarily throughout the SIC each time a
new hydropower project began operation because it lowered the system’s overall marginal
costs. See supra Part IV.C.
166. See supra note 164.
167. BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 51–73.
168. Id. at 64.
169. See supra Part III.C; BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23; Bauer, The Experience of Chilean Water Markets, supra note 67.
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C. The 1998–99 Drought Crisis and Political Responses
While Argentine natural gas was still abundant, hydropower in
Chile was dealt another blow by a drought in 1998–99. It was Chile’s
most severe drought of the twentieth century. The lack of rain and snow
reduced hydropower generation so much that the SIC suffered electricity
shortages and frequent blackouts for months, causing serious economic
losses for many people and organizations. The emergency revealed the
drawbacks of the central grid’s dependence on hydropower in dramatic
fashion. Political reactions and proposed reforms followed immediately.
Although the lack of rain was a major factor, the electricity crisis
also revealed flaws in Chile’s legal and regulatory framework. The worst
of these flaws involved how prices were set, how risks and costs were
allocated among different parties, how conflicts were resolved, and how
reservoirs were managed. The government responded by proposing reforms to the Electric Law. This was the first time the Concertación had
tried to change the legislation after nearly a decade in office. Until then,
the government had tried to reform electricity policies through administrative regulations and the Anti-Monopoly Commission.
The government’s proposals triggered five years of heated political and policy debates. What had gone wrong in Chile’s electricity sector
and how should it be fixed? The debate about these questions dragged
on as the government tried to negotiate a reform—in a process similar to
the Water Code reform—that right-wing political parties and private sector interest groups would accept. The process stretched over two administrations of the Concertación, as President Ricardo Lagos succeeded
President Eduardo Frei in March 2000. During this period the government proposed a series of alternatives, most prominently the Ley Larga,170
which was defeated in 2001, and the Ley Corta,171 which was finally
passed in 2004 (and then amended by the Ley Corta II172 in 2005).173 Beginning in 2002, the crisis in Argentina put additional strain on the Chilean
energy sector.
The government’s basic priorities throughout this period were to
steadily increase electricity supplies while keeping prices to consumers
as low as possible. These had also been the government’s priorities earlier in the 1990s but they became much more pressing during and after
the drought crisis. The two priorities were somewhat contradictory in a
market-oriented system like Chile’s; increasing supplies depended on

170.
171.
172.
173.

See infra
Law no.
Law no.
See infra

note 184.
19,940 (Mar. 3, 2004). See also sources cited supra note 186, 188.
20,018 (May 19, 2005). See also sources cited supra note 186, 188.
Part V.D.
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private investment to build new projects, but companies had little incentive to invest if the government kept electricity prices low or threatened
the stability of the status quo. The government sought to overcome this
dilemma by promoting greater competition within the electricity sector,
arguing that this would both increase supplies and lower prices. However, the government had to walk a fine line between criticizing the
power companies’ behavior on one hand and encouraging them to keep
investing on the other.174
The years of debate showed two major political and economic issues affecting hydropower in Chile. The first issue is that the relationship
between hydropower and thermal power is complicated and sometimes
contradictory; in some contexts the two forms of generation have conflicting interests, in other contexts their interests are complementary. Although some of the conflicts are due to technological differences, others
are due to policy and regulation—particularly the legal allocation of different risks, costs, and benefits. Since the three largest generation companies rely on different combinations of hydro and thermal power, these
companies often have quite different economic stakes in the operation of
the electricity sector and the decisions of regulators.175 Some of these conflicts also play out in the transmission subsector.
The second issue is that the Chilean electricity sector as a whole
has suffered from problems of regulatory governance, particularly for
resolving conflicts with high stakes. Many experts and stakeholders, of

174. In disputes with the government, the power companies’ strongest leverage has
often been to delay (or threaten to delay) new investments. See supra Part IV.C.
175. For example, the government managed to pass several changes to the Electric Law
in June 1999 (fairly early in the debate), including the so-called “Article 99 bis” (“bis” refers
to a modification added to a previous legal rule). The arrival of winter rains was finally
ending the drought but the crisis atmosphere still dominated political debate. Article 99 bis
referred to the required level of security of power supplies, in relation to hydrologic risk
and uncertainty. The military government had added the original Article 99 bis in February
1990 (just before leaving office) as a result of an earlier drought in 1989. That 1990 amendment required generation companies to compensate their clients for any power shortages
that occurred within the range of hydrological conditions that the CNE used to calculate
node prices; the corollary was that generators had no obligation to compensate clients
when conditions were more extreme. The drought in 1998–99 was so severe that it fell
outside that established range of conditions, which relieved the generators of liability. The
June 1999 reform responded by shifting the burden of liability onto the generators, obligating them to compensate clients for shortages no matter what, with no exceptions. The government’s intention was to force the power companies to increase their generation capacity
and reserve supplies. The wisdom of Article 99 bis was sharply criticized by many economists (and not only by the government’s opponents) because of its perverse incentives for
private investment. Many power companies were reluctant to invest in additional generators for fear of being held financially responsible for events outside their control. See, e.g.,
PAREDES & SAPAG, FORTALEZAS Y DEBILIDADES, supra note 80.
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diverse political views, criticized the institutional framework for being
ineffective, incompetent, or subject to political influences behind the
scenes. Some of the criticisms were addressed in the Ley Corta, which
created a panel of experts as a new means of resolving conflicts within
the electricity sector.176 Some of the conflicts have involved hydropower
directly, such as in the operation of reservoirs, while in other matters
hydropower issues have been indirect or not important.
These flaws of institutions and governance are critical in a system
so dominated by neoliberal restructuring, in which Chilean government
authority was weaker and more fragmented than it had been in the past.
The arrival of large foreign capital added a new twist. In August 1997,
ENDESA’s management shocked the Chilean public by announcing the
company’s sale to ENDESA España, the large Spanish power company.177 This deal turned out to be extremely controversial, and the ensuing legal battles and newspaper headlines went on for years. ENDESA
España persevered and eventually succeeded in taking over ENDESA,
albeit at a higher price than the original deal.178
The arrival of ENDESA España marked a turning point in the political economy of the Chilean electricity sector. Although in most respects ENDESA’s operations in Chile did not change because of the new
foreign ownership, there is no doubt that the political dynamics shifted.
The shift has particularly affected the debate about hydropower in Patagonia, where there is a blurry line between foreign companies’ plans and
Chile’s national interest.
These problems of regulatory governance are illustrated in an excellent article about the 1998–99 electricity crisis; the article was pub176. Many examples of these arguments can be found in presentations at the annual
Conferences of Electricity Law and Policy (Jornadas Eléctricas) held at the Catholic University Law School in Santiago, several years following 2000. See also infra Part V.D.
177. The Spanish company had the same name and acronym as the Chilean company.
In this article I use “ENDESA” to refer to ENDESA Chile, and “ENDESA España” for the
Spanish company.
178. The Chilean managers, led by ENDESA’s president José Yuraszcek, explained that
the company had become so successful that it had outgrown the Chilean domestic market,
but to undertake a new round of international expansion it needed much greater financial
resources. The Spaniards, for their part, gained an entry point, a base of operations, and a
strategic partnership for their expansion throughout Latin America. The deal would have
paid the Chilean managers very well and they would have continued to play a leadership
role in the new multinational enterprise. In Chile the initial public reactions were positive
and ENDESA’s managers were congratulated for having made the “deal of the century.”
Within a few weeks, however, as more details emerged, the deal was increasingly criticized
for violating financial regulations, business ethics, or both. Soon it became known instead
as the “scandal of the century,” and Yuraszcek was forced to resign in October 1997. See
Franco Parisi & Guillermo Yanez, The Deal of the Century in Chile: Endesa España’s Takeover of
Enersis, 9 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCIAL ANALYSIS 103 (2000).
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lished by three Chilean economists soon after the crisis had ended but
with the political debate about reforms well under way.179 The authors
examined the causes, effects, and lessons of the crisis. They argued that
the crisis revealed several structural defects in Chile’s electricity regulation, although they disagreed with the government’s diagnosis of those
defects. At the time, the government’s argument was that the private
utilities had not invested enough money to produce adequate supplies of
electricity and, therefore, government regulation should be strengthened.
The authors, however, put hydropower at the center of their analysis. Their point of departure was that Chile’s heavy dependence on hydropower meant that occasional power shortages were inevitable due to
natural climatic and hydrologic variability. When there is a drought,
therefore, the system must be able to adjust by reducing demand and
reallocating scarce power supplies. In 1998–99, the authors argued, scarcity became a crisis as a result of regulatory and institutional failures.180
Conflicts between hydro and thermal power were at the heart of each of
these problems, which included: an overly rigid system of regulated
prices (i.e., node prices that could not rise to reflect greater scarcity); a
dysfunctional mechanism for coordinating transfers of energy and
money between generators (i.e., the spot market administered by the
CDEC); and flawed arrangements for managing the water stored in reservoirs like Lake Laja and Lake Maule.181
The authors argued that the water stored in reservoirs was used
up quickly and inefficiently during 1998 without any accompanying
measures, such as raising prices or rationing supplies, to reduce demand
for electricity. This meant that reserve hydropower capacity was very
low when the drought went on longer than expected. Another unexpected problem was the mechanical breakdown of Colbún’s Nehuenco
power plant, a large new thermal generator that would have supplied
much of the electricity deficit. The decision to draw down the reservoirs
early was partly due to conflicts within the CDEC or between the different utilities that were CDEC’s members. The conflicts were about how
much compensation the different utilities would have to pay and to
whom. Those conflicts lingered unresolved for months because of
problems in the CDEC’s internal governance and also because of the passivity and delay of government regulators, particularly, the Ministry of
the Economy. The decision was also influenced by utilities lobbying the
government. The Ministry of Public Works controlled the water stored
for irrigation purposes in the reservoirs and the evidence indicates that
179. Dı́az et al., La Crisis Eléctrica, supra note 80.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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that water was transferred to hydropower—mainly to ENDESA—at a
low price and without conditions on its use.182
The study concluded that the critical reforms needed were to
make the price system more flexible and to reduce—not strengthen—the
regulators’ authority to resolve conflicts between private companies.
Their critique of the regulators is well supported, although one can also
sympathize with the regulators who were in a difficult situation with
tight political constraints. Moreover, the authors did not identify any
plausible alternative institutional arrangements for conflict resolution. In
any case, the important point for purposes of hydropower is that the
management of Chile’s largest reservoirs was strongly affected by political and governance mechanisms that were complex and out of the public
eye.
D. “Long” and “Short” Laws
During the year 2000, the CNE developed an ambitious and comprehensive proposal for legislative reform, which became known as the
Ley Larga or “long law.” This was a priority issue for the new government of President Ricardo Lagos.183 The proposal was made public in
September and sent to Congress in October. It contained significant
changes in the regulations affecting all three electricity subsectors, while
continuing to rely mainly on price incentives and market competition.
The new law “should regulate the sector for the next 20 years” according
to the head of the CNE184 although few of the proposed changes addressed hydropower directly.
The proposed reform met strong opposition from private business
interests and conservative politicians mainly because of its ambitious
scope. By mid-2001, the government had to withdraw the proposal as
politically unviable. The government responded by scaling back its approach and trying to select a smaller number of issues about which there
might be more consensus for reform. This next round of proposals was

182. Id. See also BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24, at 79–118 (detailing a similar episode in the early 1990s).
183. In January 2000, the outgoing administration of President Eduardo Frei briefly
floated a proposal that would have introduced rules to restrict the concentrated ownership
and vertical integration that characterized the electricity sector. See Nueva Ley Eléctrica Enfatiza Desconcentración de Propiedad, EL MERCURIO, Jan. 26, 2000, available at http//www.
elmercurio.cl. The incoming administration of President Ricardo Lagos, however, took office in March and named a new head of the CNE, Vivianne Blanlot, who then developed a
new proposal for the Ley Larga.
184. Alejandro Faine, Gobierno Lanza Nueva Ley Eléctrica que Regulará los Próximos 20
Años del Sector, LA SEGUNDA, Sept. 13, 2000, available at http//www.lasegunda.cl.
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called the Ley Corta or “short law,” since it was a shorter list than the
previous round.185
The Ley Corta also proved politically contentious despite the proposal’s narrower scope. It provoked more than two years of political debate both inside and outside the government. This included an extended,
public dispute between the Minister of the Economy and the head of the
CNE, who had different positions on some of the law’s key issues. The
dispute ended with the CNE head’s resignation in July 2003.186 The large
electricity companies lobbied actively throughout the political process,
often on different sides of particular issues, with the competing economic interests between hydropower and thermal power explaining
most of those differences.
The most contentious issue was the cost of transmission; there
was debate about how to set the fees for using the transmission grid,
how to provide incentives to the private sector to invest more money in
that grid, and how to allocate the costs between generators and consumers. Although distribution companies had to pay some of these costs,
they were eventually passed on to consumers. Much of the policy debate
was quite technical but the bottom line was that distance is an important
factor in the cost of transmission, and most Chilean hydropower plants
were located farther away from the centers of consumption than thermal
power plants. As a result, the different alternatives for setting transmission fees affected the two kinds of generators to different degrees. Under
the existing law, generators paid 100 percent of transmission fees, while
the Ley Corta would transfer some of those fees to consumers.
The debate revolved around transmission costs for several reasons. Most obvious was the clash of economic interests between different
power companies. Beyond that, however, there were broader implications for national energy strategy. How should Chile diversify its energy
sources and increase the security of supplies? How important was future
energy integration with Argentina and other South American countries?
Was it important to connect the SIC—the central grid—with the SING in
the north? Who would have to pay higher prices as a result? Policy decisions about electricity transmission were critical to such long-range
plans, and the broader issues inevitably got tangled up in more immediate political and economic conflicts.187

185. A very similar process took place with the Water Code reform. See BAUER, SIREN
SONG, supra note 23, at 51–73.
186. Vivianne Blanlot: La Batalla Continua en el Congreso, SIETE+7, July 11, 2003, at 12–13.
187. One illustration of this problem was the clash between the Minister of Economy
and the head of the CNE. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. The Chilean press
focused a lot of attention on the personal ties of these two people to Gener and ENDESA,
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The Ley Corta was finally passed in early 2004. There were new
incentives for private investment in the transmission grid and in additional generators. The law also created a “panel of experts” to help resolve conflicts. The power companies were initially satisfied because the
rules of the game had been clarified after years of uncertainty. The
spring of 2004 was also marked by another round of Argentine government restrictions of natural gas exports, triggering more discussion in
Chile about the need to raise electricity prices in order to increase the
security of supply. Many energy experts and utilities called for an end to
the CNE’s regulation of node prices, in favor of prices freely negotiated
between buyers and sellers.188
The Electric Law was amended, yet again, in the spring of 2005,
only one year after the Ley Corta. The government was worried that private investment in new infrastructure was falling short of expectations,
which was especially troubling because of the several-year time lag between starting a project and producing new power supplies. As a result,
the government proposed the Ley Corta II to allow higher prices and
longer-term stability of prices. The new law made the CNE’s calculation
of node prices more flexible—to adjust more closely to changing market
conditions—so that consumers would pay an estimated 12–20 percent
more. The law also allowed utilities and their clients to establish longterm contracts that fixed prices for periods of up to 15 years. The Ley
Corta II was quickly approved by the Congress.189
The Ley Corta II seems to have finally given investors the incentives and security they were waiting for. In 2005, Chilean electric companies announced more than 20 new projects to be built over the next
decade—totaling more than 5,000 MW, for a total cost of US$4 billion—
with some of these projects early in their planning stages. Hydropower
dominates the list for new projects and, while ENDESA’s projects in Patagonia were the largest, several other companies were also planning runof-the-river dams in central and south-central Chile.190 The Water Code
respectively, and hence their alleged representation of either thermal or hydropower
interests.
188. Carola Rojas, El Precio de la Seguridad, QUÉ PASA, June 25, 2004.
189. See Rodrı́quez-Empresas Eléctricas: La Soterrada Guerra por las Tarifas, DIARIO ESTRATEGIA, Mar. 28, 2005, available at http://www.bcn.cl/carpeta_temas/temas_portada.
2005-10-26.1398811570/archivos_prensa.2005-10-28.6273151645/articulos_prensa.2005-1028.5990918217 (then follow the link to content) (last visited Feb. 9, 2010); Mariano Cubillos
et al., Congreso Aprueba Reforma Eléctrica que Incentiva Inversiones y Aumenta Precios, LA
TERCERA, May 4, 2005, http://www.quepasa.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,3255_5676_129710671,
00.html (last visited July 14, 2009).
190. Viancos, Hidroeléctricas Retoman Fuerte Protagonismo, supra note 2; Viancos, 23
Nuevos Proyectos Avivan Oferta Eléctrica, supra note 2; Viancos, La Millonaria Agenda Eléctrica,
supra note 2.
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reform also passed at this time, reflecting a broad consensus about the
need to boost new hydropower development as soon as possible.191
E. Hydropower Projects in Patagonia 2004–06
In June 2004, after the Ley Corta had passed, ENDESA announced
updated plans for large-scale hydropower development in Patagonia.
ENDESA’s next planned hydro project was Neltume in Region X, at the
northern end of Patagonia, with a capacity of about 400 MW. After that
the company proposed four large dams in Region XI, two on the Baker
River and two on the Pascua River. These four dams would have a total
capacity of 2,800 MW, equally divided between the two river basins, at a
time when the SIC’s total hydropower capacity was then about 4,700
MW. The total cost of these projects was estimated at US$1.5 billion, plus
an additional US$1 billion for the new transmission lines. ENDESA
planned to do the detailed designs in 2005 and to begin construction
about four or five years later. Moreover, the company requested additional new water rights to allow more projects in the future.192
After the Ley Corta II passed in 2005, this latest hydropower boom
gained increasing momentum. ENDESA began to move forward aggressively with its Patagonia projects, sending dozens of technicians to Region XI to complete field studies and more detailed engineering designs.
This was countered by a more active and higher-profile campaign by
Chilean environmental NGOs and other opponents of the dams—including regional tourism interests and salmon farmers.193 At this time, there
were also conflicting reports about whether ENDESA might redesign
some of the dam projects to reduce their environmental impacts, for example, by making the dams or reservoirs smaller.
In 2005, Colbún moved strongly into large-scale hydropower development as the Matte Group, one of Chile’s largest and most powerful
business conglomerates, acquired a controlling interest in the company.
The Matte Group had been Colbún’s main Chilean partner, in association with the European partner Tractebel (later re-named Suez Energy),
191. See supra Part III.C.
192. See supra Part I. See also Valeria Ibarra, ENDESA Planea Construir Cinco Centrales en
15 Años por U.S. $2,800 Millones, LA TERCERA, June 26, 2004, at 33.
193. Supra note 9 and accompanying text. See also Ecologistas Preparan Ofensiva Contra
Hidroeléctricas de Endesa en Aysén, LA TERCERA, Sept. 29, 2005; Oriana Fernandez and Sebastian Vasquez, ONG Extranjeras Apoyan Campaña Contra Centrales de Endesa en XI Región, LA
TERCERA, Oct. 6, 2005 (naming Carl Bauer as a foreign researcher supporting the campaign,
based on the Chilean writers’ mistaken assumption that Resources for the Future was an
environmental advocacy group rather than a policy think-tank), available at http://www.
icarito.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,3255_5666_163630605,00.html; Francisca Skoknic and Pablo
Gazzolo, Robert Kennedy: Apoyaré a Quienes Defienda los Rı́os Chilenos, QUÉ PASA, Oct. 2005.
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since the company was privatized in 1996.194 In mid-2005, the Matte
Group bought more of Suez Energy’s stake and added its own existing
portfolio of small and medium hydropower dams in Regions V and X—
eight dams totaling about 500 MW. A few months later, in December
2005, Colbún’s new management reorganized the company and announced plans to invest US$800 million in new hydro and thermal
power projects. In Chile that is a lot of money, similar in scale to a large
foreign mining project.195
These moves set the stage for a big surprise in April of 2006:
Colbún reached an agreement with ENDESA to join the projects in Patagonia. Colbún would contribute slightly under half of the capital needed
for the four dams in ENDESA’s proposal. The advantages for ENDESA
were political as well as economic. In addition to freeing up some of the
capital that ENDESA had committed to the projects, the agreement
broadened national political support. The Matte Group has a great deal
of political clout in Chile and ENDESA’s opponents could no longer simply claim that Patagonia was threatened by a foreign corporation—ENDESA España. For Colbún the advantage was to increase its total
generation capacity by 50 percent and to add more hydropower to its
portfolio. Without ENDESA’s Patagonia projects, Colbún did not have
the water rights needed for large new hydro projects.196 The new joint
venture was named HidroAysén.

194. Colbún’s financial situation improved after the 1998–99 electricity crisis, during
which it had been the biggest loser of Chile’s three major electric utilities. By 2003, Colbún
was considered the healthiest, if still the smallest, of the three; compared to ENDESA and
Gener, it was the most evenly balanced between hydro and thermal power and its assets
were all in Chile, somewhat insulated from the economic problems of neighboring countries. See Juan Pablo Rioseco, Viento a Favor de Colbún, QUÉ PASA, Mar. 29, 2002, http://
www.quepasa.cl; Solange Vega, El Ojo Eléctrico de los Matte, QUÉ PASA, Apr. 11, 2003; Alejandro Sáez Rojas, Los Destellos de Colbún, EL MERCURIO, Oct. 5, 2003, at B3, available at http:/
/diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={96b9ca9c-eb1e-460f-81a7-80b6c8951e7b};
Carola Rojas, Colbún: Objeto de Deseo, QUÉ PASA, Feb. 20, 2004.
195. See Valeria Ibarra, Grupo Matte se Transforma en el Segundo Operador Eléctrico del
Paı́s, LA TERCERA, Aug. 4, 2005, available at http://www.icarito.cl/medio/articulo/
0,0,3255_5676_152186673,00.html (last visited July 14, 2009); Sandra Rojas, Nuevo Gerente
Reorganiza Colbún y Anuncia Inversiones por U.S. $800 Millones, LA TERCERA, Dec. 18, 2005,
available at http://edelect.latercera.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,3255_5676_177567288,00.html
(last visited July 14, 2009).
196. See Carla Alonso, El Factor Matte: La Alianza Colbún-ENDESA y las Cifras Alegres del
Negocio Hidroeléctrico, LA NACIÓN, Apr. 17, 2006, http://www.mapuexpress.net/content/
publications/print.php?id=308; ENDESA y Colbún Acuerdan Fórmula para Alianza en
Proyecto Aysén, LA TERCERA, Apr. 27, 2006, available at http://www.icarito.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,3255_5676_203218517,00.html (last visited July 14, 2009).
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F. Epilogue: Updating Events to 2009
Most of the research for this article was finished in mid-2006. In
the three years since then, there have been many changes in the day-today details of relevant issues in Chile, although none of these changes
significantly affect my analysis here. I have followed these issues as carefully as I can through Chilean news media, personal and professional
contacts there, and regular travel, and in the following paragraphs I offer
a brief summary update.
1. HidroAysén and Patagoniau
This national and international conflict has continued to be
heated. In December 2006, the fourth consecutive government of the Concertación, led by President Michelle Bachelet, declared its continued support for hydropower development in the Aysén Region, while insisting
that all projects would have to earn approval through the national System for Environmental Impact Assessment.197 In 2007, a new actor entered the scene, Xstrata, a Swiss-owned company which had acquired
the water rights from an earlier, now-abandoned project to build an aluminum smelter in Aysén. Xstrata presented its environmental impact
study in January, while HidroAysén’s was still in preparation.198 Meanwhile the CNE began to include future Patagonian hydropower in its
calculations of future node prices.199
HidroAysén suffered a setback in August 2007, when the government released two technical reports, with the DGA and the Minister of
Environment criticizing aspects of the projects’ original designs. The
company responded by reducing the planned size of some of the reservoirs.200 The DGA continued its challenge by asking Chile’s Court for the

197. See Andrea Sierra, El Gobierno Está Consciente de que los Recursos en Aisén Van a
Tener que Usarse, EL MERCURIO, Dec. 10, 2006 (interview with Public Works Minister
Eduardo Bitrán), available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={fc4f7eb4f8ea-4623-8d5b-bf2988f4cd67}; CNE Defiende Plan Hidroeléctrico en Aisén, EL MERCURIO, Dec.
12, 2006. On the System for Environmental Impact Assessment, see sources cited supra note
30 and accompanying text.
198. José Miguel Jaque, Central Rı́o Cuervo Entró a Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto
Ambiental, LA NACIÓN, Jan. 3, 2007.
199. Gobierno de Nueva y Potente Señal para Construcción de Centrales Eléctricas en Aisén, EL
MERCURIO, Mar. 20, 2007, available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={07a4a7ec-b1fc-497c-9467-aeb68f9061bf}. See also supra text accompanying notes
129–131.
200. See Carla Alonso & Darı́o Zambra, Los Estudios que Doblaron la Mano a Endesa y los
Matte, LA NACIÓN, Aug. 5, 2007; José Miguel Jaque, El Costo no lo Va a Pagar el Medio
Ambiente, LA NACIÓN, Aug. 10, 2007, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias/
site/artic/20070809/pags/20070809215456.html.
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Defense of Free Competition201—formerly the Anti-Monopoly Commission—to rule on the question of whether HidroAysén, by combining ENDESA and Colbún, represented an excessive concentration of the
ownership of water rights. In October, the Court decided in favor of the
companies’ joint venture but imposed several conditions to reduce their
monopoly power. Most notably, the Court ordered the companies to sell
some of their water rights and to withdraw pending requests for other
rights located in specific rivers. The Court also made recommendations
affecting the future transmission lines to central Chile and the internal
governance of the CDEC.202
In October 2007, the Italian power company ENEL bought a majority stake in ENDESA España, with no apparent effect on the Spanish
company’s operations in Chile.203 In August of 2008, HidroAysén finally
presented its environmental impact study after years of work. To widespread surprise in Chile, considering the companies’ political influence
and the large sums spent on professional consultants, the report was criticized by numerous government agencies for providing inadequate information and poor quality analysis. The DGA was particularly critical
and, in October 2008, the agency denied some of the companies’ pending
applications for new water rights that were part of the proposed redesign of the projects.204 HidroAysén finally withdrew the environmental
impact study in order to resubmit it in 2009. While the projects are certainly not dead, their approval has turned out to be far from the foregone
conclusion that many people (including myself) had assumed.

201. See Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, http://www.tdlc.cl/Portal.Base/Web/VerContenido.aspx?GUID=&ID=628 (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
202. José Troncoso Ostornol, Tribunal de la Competencia Aprueba Alianza entre Endesa y
Colbún con Cuatro Condiciones, EL MERCURIO, Oct. 20, 2007, available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={88236b91-c1b8-443f-8d44-cac6c0792977}. See also Tribunal
de Defensa de la Libre Competencia, Resolución No. 22/2007 (Oct. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Resoluci%C3%B3n_22_2007.pdf.
203. See supra note 6.
204. See Antonio Valencia, Duros Informes Fiscales Contra Proyecto HidroAysén, LA NACIÓN, Oct. 9, 2008, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias_v2/site/artic/
20081008/pags/20081008215616.html; D. Bustamante & V. Moya, DGA Rechaza Nuevos Derechos de Agua a Central de HidroAysén Pese a Respaldo Inicial de Gobierno, EL MERCURIO, Nov.
5, 2008, available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={d29401de-036e-462cbca8-03ecbd792976}; Lorena Rubio, Cortocircuito en HidroAysén, REVISTA QUÉ PASA, available
at http://www.quepasa.cl/medio/articulo/0,0,38039290_101111578_372972504,00.html;
Darı́o Zambra, HidroAysén se Hunde, LA NACIÓN, Nov. 16, 2008, available at http://www.
lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias_v2/site/artic/20081116/pags/20081116012421.html.
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2. Other Hydropower Development
AES-Gener, a company that has traditionally depended heavily on
thermal power generation, has proposed a large hydropower dam in the
mountains near Santiago, on the upper Maipo River. The project has
been opposed by environmentalists and local residents, and has also met
problems with Aguas Andinas—the large multinational company that
supplies water to the metropolitan region of Santiago.205
There are also two other foreign companies, based in Norway and
Australia, that have been building small and medium hydropower
projects in central and southern Chile. Both companies have focused on
run-of-the-river projects, and have largely succeeded in avoiding environmental and other water conflicts.206
On a small to medium scale, a number of irrigators and canalusers’ associations have also been retrofitting their irrigation canals to
produce electricity in order to take advantage of rising prices. In some
cases, this has apparently led to new alliances with power companies
that were formerly adversaries.207
3. Electricity Policies
In the last two years, Chile’s government has responded in two
somewhat contradictory ways to the continuing threat of national electricity shortages and high prices. On one hand, there is powerful political
pressure to approve and build large new projects as quickly as possible.
These certainly include more hydropower dams, despite the unexpected
delays in Patagonia, but they include an unabashed revival of coal-burning power plants as well. There is also increasing talk of the inevitability
of nuclear power.208 On the other hand, there have been several studies
and reports about renewable and non-conventional sources of energy.
205. D. Bustamante & R. Barrı́a, Corema Aprueba Obras para la Hidroeléctrica Alto Maipo y
Opositores Irán a Tribunales, EL MERCURIO, Mar. 27, 2009, available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={f7e52948-c309-4930-99e4-09356b2c1d98}.
206. See SN Power, http://www.snpower.no/; Pacific Hydro, http://www.pacific
hydro.com.au/.
207. Personal Communication with Alejandro Vergara, July 2008 (on file with author);
see also COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE RIEGO, CENTRALES HIDROELÉCTRICAS ASOCIADAS A OBRAS DE
RIEGO: MANUAL PARA ORGANIZACIONES DE USUARIOS DE AGUAS (2008), available at http://
www.cnr.gob.cl/opensite_20061215151203.aspx.
208. See Beatriz Mitchell & Alejandra Carmona, Una Poderosa Carga Eléctrica: El Lobby
para no Quedarse a Oscuras, LA NACIÓN, Oct. 26, 2008, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/
prontus_noticias_v2/site/artic/20081025/pags/20081025173530.html; Paula Comandari,
La Secreta Agenda Nuclear Chilena, Qué Pasa, Apr. 2008, available at http://www.icarito.cl/
medio/articulo/0,0,38039290_101111578_349412866,00.html; José Antonio Viera-Gallo,
Minister of the Presidency, Remarks made to Chilean Chamber of Construction, La
Energı́a: Debates y Decisiones (May 21, 2008).
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Such alternatives have long been dismissed as naı̈ve or unimportant by
Chile’s political and economic elite, but in the current context that attitude has started to change. In March 2008, the government passed a new
law requiring generators to obtain 5 percent of the electricity they sell
from renewable energy sources between 2010 and 2014, increasing to 10
percent in 2024.209
4. Water Rights Law and Policy
Despite the 2005 reform of the Water Code,210 political and legal
conflicts over water rights have continued to be fierce and it is too early
to conclude much about the reform’s concrete impacts. There is some
evidence that the new fees for non-use have led to greater numbers of
DGA auctions of water rights—especially non-consumptive rights—and,
in at least one case, the resulting prices were high enough to send ripples
through Chilean legal and business circles.211 If that trend continues, it
will meet the reformers’ goals of shaking up the current situation of monopoly, speculative ownership, and barriers to new development.
Nonetheless, there seems to be growing social and political opposition to the neoliberal essence of the Water Code. A variety of left-leaning politicians, including members of the governing Concertación—along
with many social and environmental activists, and the strong voice of the
Catholic Archbishop of Aysén—have called for the “nationalization” of
water resources.212 Some of these arguments have displayed a poor understanding of the legal nuances of the current system, for example,
209. See STEPHEN HALL ET AL., ¿SE NECESITAN REPRESAS EN LA PATAGONIA? UN ANÁLISIS
FUTURO ENERGÉTICO CHILENO (2009); PROGRAMA DE ESTUDIOS E INVESTIGACIONES EN
ENERGÍA DEL INSTITUTO DE ASUNTOS PÚBLICOS DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE & NÚCLEO
MILENIO DE ELECTRÓNICA INDUSTRIAL Y MECATRÓNICA, CENTRO DE INNOVACIÓN EN ENERGÍA
DE LA UNIVERSIDAD TÉCNICA FEDERICO SANTA MARIA, APORTE POTENCIAL DE ENERGÍAS RENOVABLES NO CONVENCIONALES Y EFICIENCIA ENERGÉTICA A LA MATRIZ ELÉCTRICA, 2008–25
(2008), available at http://www.eula.cl/doc/chile_new_renewables.pdf; Beatriz Mitchell, La
Sorpresa Renovable: Estudio de Energı́a Sustentable Deja Chica a la Ley, LA NACIÓN, Aug. 10,
2008, available at http://www.lnd.cl/prontus_noticias_v2/site/artic/20080809/pags/2008
0809190947.html.
210. See supra Part III.C.
211. This was the case with the Rı́o Manso in Region X. See Escasez y Alta Demanda por
Derechos de Agua Disparan Precios, ESTRATEGIA, June 26, 2008.
212. See, e.g., Proyecto de Ley Busca Nacionalizar el Agua, LA NACIÓN, Mar. 20, 2008; Claudia Urquieta Chavarrı́a, Obispo de Aisén Lanza Dura Carta Medioambiental con Leonardo Boff,
EL MOSTRADOR, Aug. 25, 2008, available at http://www.defendamoslaciudad.cl/modulos.
php?mod=noticias&fn=94e679ab46d568928ad91afb91a749bb&id=1037; Humberto Peña
Torrealba & Pablo Jaeger Cousino, ¿Nacionalización del Agua?, EL MERCURIO, Dec. 20, 2008,
available at http://www.unesco.org.uy/phi/conaphi/chile/fileadmin/templates/conaphi.
cl/documentos/Nacionalizacion_del_Agua_HP-PJ_20122208.pdf. The New York Times
picked up the story of “the country’s intensifying water wars.” See Alexei Barrionuevo,
DEL
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water is already public property in formal terms and many critics have
overlooked the distinction between consumptive and non-consumptive
water rights. The gist of the criticism is clear, however, and it is undoubtedly true that private ownership and control of non-consumptive water
rights is highly concentrated in Chile. In response, the current Minister
of Public Works has proposed several legislative and constitutional
changes that would increase public restrictions on private property
rights.213
In addition, the level of conflict over water among powerful economic actors is high. A leading Chilean business magazine recently published a cover story titled, “The Water Is Boiling,” which described the
variety of intensifying water conflicts in different regions of the country
from north to south.214 Interviews with corporate executives and the
head of the DGA agreed that growing numbers of high-stakes conflicts
were ending up in court and many were leading to expensive and ad hoc
financial settlements.215
Finally, and most relevant to my argument in this article, ENDESA has taken legal action to try to convince the courts that electricity
law is superior to water law in managing river basins. The specific issues
are technical and apply to particular local disputes with irrigators and,
so far, there has not been a definitive resolution. But the steam is building up.216
5. Climate Change
In Chile, as in so many countries, issues of climate change have
gone from obscure scientific debates to headline news over the past few
years. In early 2007, the National Environment Commission released a
study concluding that global warming would cause higher temperatures
in Chile and, therefore, less snowfall and more rain and flooding. The

Chilean Town Withers in Free-Market for Water, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at 8 (quoting and
partially misquoting Carl Bauer).
213. Claudia Urquieta Chavarrı́a, MOP se la Juega por Abrir Debate Polı́tico, EL MOSTRADOR, Jan. 7, 2009; El Agua como Derecho Constitucional, EL MOSTRADOR, Sept. 21, 2009.
214. Roberto Sapag, Hierve el Agua, CAPITAL N. 255, June 26–July 9, 2009, at 40-48, available at http://www.capital.cl/reportajes-y-entrevistas/hierve-el-agua-2.html.
215. Id.
216. SNA se Enfrenta a Endesa en Demanda por Control de Embalses, EL DIARIO FINANCIERO,
Apr. 25, 2008, available at http://www.chilepotenciaalimentaria.cl/content/view/173358/
SNA-se-enfrenta-a-Endesa-en-demanda-por-control-de-embalses.html; Claudia Urquieta
Chavarrı́a, La Última Jugada de Endesa para Concentrar sin Contrapesos Derechos de Agua, EL
MOSTRADOR, May 12, 2008, available at http://www.ecosistemas.cl/1776/fo-article-82026.
pdf.
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impact was predicted to be severe for agriculture and for hydropower.217
At the same time, the Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change indicated that precipitation in central and south-central
Chile was likely to drop by 15 to 20 percent over the next 75 years.218 One
of the implications was that hydropower in Patagonia might become especially attractive in that context.219 Most recently, in November 2009, a
United Nations study of the economics of climate change in Chile concluded that decreasing precipitation would cause hydropower generation to decline 10 to 20 percent over the next century, at an estimated cost
of US$100 million per year. Chile’s Minister of Environment said that the
study would form the basis of the country’s position in the international
climate meetings in Copenhagen in December 2009.220
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this article I have argued that hydropower is a nexus between
water and energy—both a use of water and a source of electrical
power—and, therefore, we need to look at hydropower regulation along
two different axes—from the different perspectives of the water sector
and the electricity sector. The structure of the article reflects this two-part
analysis. I discussed hydropower regulation, first, in the context of other
water uses and water rights at the scale of river basins and, second, in
the context of the national electricity sector and the crucial relationship
with thermal power generation. In each sector, I also focused on the institutional law and economics of property rights and markets—the rules
of the game.
This two-part analysis of hydropower seems to be a simple idea in
theory, almost self-evident, but it has rarely been applied in practice in
Chile or elsewhere. My approach here can apply to all countries with
mixed hydro-thermal power systems, despite different frameworks of
water and electricity laws. In the current context of global and regional

217. DEPARTAMENTO DE GEOFÍSICA, UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE, COMISIÓN NACIONAL DEL
MEDIO AMBIENTE CONAMA: ESTUDIO DE LA VARIABILIDAD CLIMÁTICA EN CHILE PARA EL
SIGLO XXI, (Dec. 2006), available at http://www.conama.cl/portal/1301/articles-39442_pdf
_Estudio_texto.pdf.
218. See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/.
219. Gustavo Orellana Venegas, Cambio Climático Llevará al Paı́s a Modificar Fuentes de
Energı́a, EL MERCURIO, Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={8ee7f0cb-a23f-4e82-8519-c7721e1ca746}.
220. Cristina Espinoza, 100 Millones de Dólares Perderá Sector Hidroeléctrico por Cambio
Climático, LA NACIÓN, Nov. 21, 2009, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/100-millones-dedolares-perdera-sector-hidroelectrico-por-cambio-climatico/noticias/2009-11-20/205450.
html.
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climate change, changes in the dual roles of hydropower are both complex and critically important. Chile is internationally significant because
it combines strong, pro-market laws in both water and electricity sectors.
How are rivers governed for multiple uses when both sectors are so market-oriented? How is the power grid governed when water and environmental trade-offs are so diverse and interconnected?
The point of the Chilean water sector analysis is that hydropower
enjoys a privileged position in a weakly regulated water rights system.
Both the 1981 Water Code and its minor reform in 2005 have favored
hydropower development, and government agencies have acted accordingly. The situation has been complicated because the Water Code has
also favored other economic uses of water and, until 2005, it also encouraged unproductive speculation in water rights. Nevertheless, hydropower has been treated as “first among equals.” The Chilean Supreme
Court favored hydropower water rights over consumptive water uses in
its 1993, landmark Pangue decision, which is still the law of the land despite its poor reasoning. The short-term benefits for hydropower interests are obvious. The long-term costs for multipurpose water
management are unknown. For water uses other than hydropower, river
basin governance and integrated water management remain weak in
Chile. Two of Chile’s most important rivers for hydropower, the Maule
and Laja, are unusual because their uppermost reservoirs are still governed by legal agreements dating from the 1940s and 1950s. Even so, the
government has favored hydropower over irrigation in managing those
reservoirs during recent droughts.221
Chilean water law does not address electricity issues, except implicitly in defining non-consumptive water rights to promote hydropower development. Likewise, Chilean electricity law does not address
water issues, except for “water as fuel”—that is, falling water as an input
for generating electrical power. For that purpose, electricity regulations
are spelled out in detail and control how dams store and release water.
There is little reference to water law, although there are a few older examples of dual-purpose dams that operate to supply irrigation water
rights as well as hydropower.
In the Chilean electricity sector, the primary issue is that hydropower is the key to national power generation, and dams with reservoir
storage are especially strategic to this generation. This strategy dates
back to the 1940s, when the government created ENDESA to carry out a
national electricity plan of which hydropower was the backbone. Since
privatization, the dynamic relationships and sometimes conflicting interests between hydropower and thermal power have been at the heart of
221. See supra Part III.
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the sector’s political economy. The tension between hydropower and
thermal power, when owned by competing companies, explains many of
the last decade’s conflicts within the Chilean electricity sector.
Chilean electricity law has granted de facto property rights to
water to the owners of hydropower dams. These are not the water rights
defined by the Water Code—which dam-owners have as well—but these
de facto rights are the rules that effectively govern how rivers are controlled, determining for what purposes the rivers are used and for whose
benefit. The CDEC’s mandatory orders to operate dams and reservoirs
are the clearest example. Another way to put this argument is that electricity law trumps water law when hydropower is present. I do not mean
to say that the two laws are in conflict, but rather that the water law is
secondary and facilitates the dominance of electricity regulations. The
best example of this is the basic principle that water is free, a principle
that is rarely questioned in Chile and certainly not in the electricity sector. As a result, wealth has been transferred from farmers, fishermen,
environmentalists, and other water users to the owners of hydropower.
This leads to an unexpected conclusion: Chilean rivers that have
hydropower dams are in fact more regulated than they seem. This is the
explanation for the Maule basin puzzle that I described in Part I; that is,
why the electricity companies were not concerned about the Water
Code’s ineffective river management. I did not understand this explanation in my previous work.222 Because Chile’s regulatory framework for
electricity is more centralized than the laissez-faire Water Code, the governance of river systems with hydropower is not as weak as it appears
from the perspective of water rights.
This conclusion is especially significant for dams with storage capacity. Building a reservoir effectively brings a river under the jurisdiction of electricity law.223 For purposes other than hydropower, however,
water regulation is weak whether the issues concern other water uses,
integrated water management, or ecosystem support. This is bad news
for water sustainability and governance.224
These lessons matter for future hydropower development in
Chile, and not only in Patagonia. From the standpoint of environmental
advocates, arguments about hydropower dams should be framed at least
partly in terms of electricity regulation. Arguments that are limited to

222. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
223. I owe this insight to David Tecklin.
224. For a more upbeat assessment written by the former head of the DGA, see generally Humberto Peña et al, Water and sustainable development: Lessons from Chile, GLOBAL
WATER PARTNERSHIP POLICY BRIEF (2004), available at http://www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library/Policybrief2Chile.pdf; see also Peña, Taking It One Step at a Time, supra note 75.
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environmental law or water law will miss the driving forces behind hydropower development and operation. This means that environmental
advocates need to understand the technicalities and trade-offs that are
fundamental to mixed hydro-thermal power systems, such as the security and efficiency of different sources of electricity generation. Environmental advocates should also analyze the basic political economy of the
electricity sector, the distribution of costs, benefits, and risks among different actors—including how price signals and incentives both reflect
and reinforce that distribution. A deeper understanding of these factors
would help to design political strategies and build innovative political
alliances.
The environmental campaign against dams in Chilean Patagonia
has some important similarities with the early stages of the environmental movement in the United States. The political conflicts over proposed
dams at Echo Park and the Grand Canyon, which were to be built by the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation in the 1950s and 1960s, involved fundamental questions about the balance between economic growth and environmental preservation.225 In Chile, an equivalent conflict was the campaign
in the 1990s against ENDESA’s Pangue and Ralco dams on the upper Bı́o
Bı́o River.226 That campaign failed to block the dams but it began to turn
the terms of national debate away from the automatic approval of new
dam projects. The current debate about Patagonia has built on that earlier change. The Chilean and U.S. historical contexts have important differences, too, of course; the influence of international factors is much
greater in Chile, as is the social and political pressure for more economic
growth.
For Chilean policymakers, in both public and private sectors, the
current hydropower boom is a critical challenge and opportunity. The
existing legal framework has let many of hydropower’s externalities go
uncompensated, both the impacts on other water uses and the environmental costs. Chile needs to strengthen capacity for integrated water
management and water governance before the next generation of hydropower development fixes water allocations in concrete. Energy policymakers, in particular, need to more carefully consider the long-term
impacts of Chile’s hydropower boom on water governance and on
ecosystem goods and services. In a world of changing climates, there are
new uncertainties in water supplies and untold levels of complexity in
the interactions between water and energy systems. The different roles of
225. See generally JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID (1971); MARC
REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 284–85
(1986).
226. See BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24.
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hydropower in water and energy are changing, just as the physical conditions of water systems are becoming more variable and unknown.
New or modified infrastructure is probably needed but this is not a good
time to build first and ask questions later.
The Chilean government’s lack of regulatory power in the energy
sector places major constraints on its national energy strategy. Government agencies such as the National Energy Commission and Ministry of
Economy have authority to enforce existing regulations but not to
change legislation that imposes strong limits on administrative discretion. Because of these limits and the dominant role of private companies,
government agencies have little capacity to require alternatives or to
change price signals affecting energy conservation, efficiency, and nonconventional or renewable sources of energy. This is a problem because
hydropower and thermal power must be regulated together or any increased costs for hydropower will simply lead to greater carbon emissions. Unfortunately, to some extent, this is already happening in
Chile.227
In the international policy arena, people look to Chile for advanced examples of markets in water and for pioneering—if dated—examples of markets in electricity. However, no one looks to Chile for
examples of governance or sustainability. Chile has been essentially absent from the last two decades of international debate about river science
and policy, particularly in the areas of environmental flows and ecosystem goods and services.228 This is unfortunate because much of that debate has been about market incentives,229 yet, the Chilean experience has
offered little because of its narrow economic emphasis.230 Today, the
leading edge of international water policy is focused on trying to achieve
a more balanced approach and, as water problems have become more
politically and socially difficult, the central concern is governance: the
institutions and processes for resolving conflicts.
The changing dual roles of hydropower are a global theme,
framed by climate change and the water-energy nexus. Many countries
lack the interdisciplinary analysis of hydropower governance as a problem that brings together water, energy, and environmental systems. We
need more studies of the relationships between hydropower and thermal
power, between hydropower and other renewable energy sources, and

227. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
228. See generally POSTEL & RICHTER, RIVERS FOR LIFE, supra note 11.
229. See, e.g., Aylward, Freshwater Ecosystem Services, supra note 15; Dustin Garrick et al.,
Water Markets and Freshwater Ecosystem Services: Policy Reform and Implementation in the Columbia and Murray-Darling Basins, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 366 (2009).
230. BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23, at 89–90.
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between large-scale and small-scale hydropower. There are water and
energy trade-offs and interactions that we are just beginning to sort out.
Sorting them out in terms of institutional change, the evolution of property rights, and governance are among the looming challenges of sustainability. In this sense, climate change represents a new set of driving
forces for an old historical problem.231
Finally, let us return to the issue of water and electricity as different commodities. In her study of the privatization and regulation of the
water industry in the United Kingdom, the geographer, Karen Bakker,
has argued that water is an “uncooperative commodity” because its unusual physical characteristics prevent its full conversion into an economic
good that can be sold for a price in a market exchange—despite strong
political support for neoliberal policies.232 I have made a similar argument; although the Water Code has more fully commodified water rights
in Chile than the United Kingdom, nevertheless the physical characteristics of water have imposed limitations in practice.233
If we apply this framework to Chilean hydropower, however, we
find a different story on the electricity side of the nexus. Chile has gone
further in all three areas of electricity policy than in the case of water; not
only in privatization and commercialization, but also in commodification. Electricity is apparently a more cooperative commodity than water,
since electricity’s physical characteristics are more readily manipulated
by humans and their technology. In short, water and electricity are physically stuck together in hydropower but they have been commodified to
different degrees. This distinction should also apply to other countries
besides Chile, since it reflects the physical nature of the two resources
rather than different legal approaches.
Thus, I conclude by reaffirming core principles of institutional law
and economics and political economy: rules come before markets. Law
and politics determine economic value as much as markets do, because
law and politics establish the rules of the game that include how property rights are defined, what costs and benefits are recognized, to whom
they are allocated, how conflicts are resolved, and who gains and who
loses.234 In the Chilean example, the electricity sector’s de facto property
rights to water, together with the courts’ preference for hydropower
231. See generally Kathleen Miller et al., Global Change in Microcosm: The Case of U.S.
Water Institutions, 29 POL’Y SCI. 271(1996).
232. See Bakker, Neoliberalizing Nature?, supra note 32, at 543–46; BAKKER, AN UNCOOPERATIVE COMMODITY, supra note 32, at 18–42.
233. See generally BAUER, AGAINST THE CURRENT, supra note 24; Bauer, Slippery Property
Rights, supra note 24.
234. See BAUER, SIREN SONG, supra note 23 and accompanying citations; Bauer, The Experience of Chilean Water Markets, supra note 67.
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water rights, have strongly affected the price of electricity and the distribution of its costs and benefits. These legal rules and political decisions
have effectively subsidized hydropower generation, despite the frequent
claim in Chile that hydropower’s dominance reflects neutral market
forces.235 Many values and interests are at stake here, in Chile and other
countries, and how to combine markets and regulation for both water
and energy will continue to be arenas of political and economic struggle.

235. Prieto, El Modelo Chileno, supra note 30; Prieto & Bauer, Hydroelectric Power,
supra note 30.
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